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ABSTRACT

Although the role of the private law has been largely ignored in studies of transitional justice,
private law is a crucial component in South Africa’s transition/transformation. Contrary to the
views of some commentators, the private law and delict in particular, were tainted by apartheid.
Further, even if the private law of South Africa was not infected by the apartheid cancer, it acted
as a carrier and facilitator of apartheid values and policies, perpetuating the inequities apartheid.
While there is evidence of the cancer in apartheid case law the more serious problem was a
failure of delict to progress under apartheid. Several important and progressive developments
that took place in the United States during this period did not occur in South Africa. Even if parts
of the law of delict were not tainted, the values underlying apartheid delict are inconsistent with
the values and aspirations of the new South Africa. As such, the law of delict was in need of
transformation. The remainder of the article details the values of the democratic transformation,
the constitutional mechanisms for the harmonization of delict with those values, and the
developments in the law of delict that have taken place in light of those values. In sum, just as
delict was part of the cancer of apartheid it is now part of the cure. The transformation of South
Africa has propelled changes in the law of delict and those changes in turn have added fuel to the
transformation, helping to further consolidate South Africa’s democracy.
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PRIVATE LAW HAVE
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CONSOLIDATING

Since the early nineties there has been an ever growing literature on transitional states
and transitional justice.1 This literature, primarily addresses what Samuel Huntington calls the
third wave of democracy.2

It concerns itself with the question of how states move from

totalitarian or authoritarian regimes to “democratic” regimes. As Ruti Teitel states, “In the
contemporary period, the use of the term ‘transition’ has come to mean change in a liberalizing
direction.”3 It is also concerned with the consolidation of democracy through the establishment
of the rule of law and regular free elections.4 The focus of the law-related literature has been on
public law solutions to the issue ranging from constitutions, mechanisms for criminal
punishment, truth and reconciliations commissions, mechanisms for reforming the bureaucracy
(lustrations), and mechanisms for providing restitution for victims.5
1

The literature is too extensive to list, but the following bibliographies represent a significant amount of the
literature: FORD FOUNDATION, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE at
http://www.fordfound.org/publications/ff_report/spring2000/truth_biblio.cfm?CFID=761098&CFTOKEN=3998539
1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); GUNNAR THEISSEN, INTERNET BIBLIOGRAPHY ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: A
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA (Version 1.1, Jan. 27, 2000) at
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~theissen/biblio/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); Reconciliation and Transitional Justice, in
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Catherine Morris ed.) at:
http://www.peacemakers.ca/bibliography/bib26reconciliation.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
2
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
3
Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013
(1997) [hereinafter Teitel, Jurisprudence]; See also RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 (2000) [hereinafter
TEITEL, JUSTICE].
4
Teitel, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 2011. Teitel notes that the literature on transitions to democracy often
focuses on political rights such as voting. TEITEL, JUSTICE, supra note 3.
5
The International Center for Transitional Justice mission statement reads in part, “...The ICTJ assists in the
development of strategies for transitional justice comprising five key elements: prosecuting perpetrators,
documenting violations through nonjudicial means such as truth commissions, reforming abusive institutions,
providing reparations to victims, and advancing reconciliation…” International Center for Transitional Justice, Our
Mission, http://www.ictj.org/aboutus.asp (last visited on Feb. 20, 2005).
Aeyal M. Gross follows Erin Daily in opening up the terrain of transitional justice to
“transformative justice,” which is said to require “metamorphosis at all levels of society.” Gross, The
Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Isreal, 40 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 47 n.10 (quoting Erin Daily, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L
LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2001-02)). While Gross is commended for looking at both property rights and socioeconomic rights as part of transitional justice, he does not venture into private law in his article.
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For instance, Juan Mendéz argues that transitional justice is important for democracy as it
“highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order based on the
rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth of each person.”6 He argues that for states in
which there have been serious human rights violations, there are four duties that they owe to the
victims: to do justice (prosecuting and punishing perpetrators), to grant victims the right to the
truth, to grant reparations to victims, and to ensure that perpetrators in the security forces should
not continue in their positions under the new regime.7
Ruti Teitel’s approach is to try to look at transitional justice from within the transitional
context.8 While Mendéz is primarily concerned with retroactive justice, for Teitel, the question
of transitional justice is not only backward looking but also forward looking. She starts her
essay with a series of questions:

“How is the social understanding behind a new regime

committed to the rule of law created? Which legal acts have transformative significance? What,
if any, is the relation between a state’s response to a repressive past and its prospects for creating
a liberal order?”9
Like Mendéz, she notes that “[d]ebates about transitional justice are generally framed by
the normative proposition that various legal responses should be evaluated on the basis of their
prospects for democracy.”10

Her thesis is that in these contexts, legal responses play an

extraordinary constituting role; they are constitutive of the transition. Her argument is that
responses to the past inform what it means to adhere to a rule of law; that past injustices impact
on what is considered transformative; and what counts as justice is contingent and informed by
6

Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 11 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).
7
Id. at 11-12. According to Méndez, a democracy that fails to give meaning to these ideals might not be worthy of
the name. Id. While these are arguably necessary conditions, they are far from sufficient.
8
Teitel, Jurisprudence, supra note 3; TEITEL, JUSTICE, supra note 3.
9
Teitel, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 2011.
10
Id.
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previous injustices.11 In her work she evaluates three areas that she believes most reflect the
transformative potential of the law: the rule of law, criminal justice, and constitutional justice.12
While these areas of the law demonstrate the clearest impact on political transformation,
it does not follow that they are the only areas of the law that have an impact. They are, perhaps,
the most public and grand areas of the law, not only in times of transition, but also in times of
stability. While it is difficult to dispute their impact on political transformation, they do not have
equal impact on economic transformation.13 Looking only at public law is missing half of the
picture. If the injustices of the past cut across the political, economic, and cultural spheres, then
the creation of a just and stable regime will require attention across these different spheres. The
usual domain of public law cannot adequately address these other areas. As a result, one needs
to look to private law as well.
If what counts as justice is partially dependent on past injustices, and if what counts as a
legal act with transformative significance is also, in part, dependent on the legacy of injustice,
then it is crucial to determine exactly what that legacy is. Injustices in the economic sphere are

11

Id. at 2014.
Teitel’s book is broader as it addresses the rule of law as well as criminal, historical, reparatory, administrative,
and constitutional justice. TEITEL, JUSTICE, supra note 3. Nonetheless, she never ventures into the private law.
13
There is little, if any, recognition of social and economic rights in Teitel’s work. (To her credit she introduced me
to the work of Aeyal Gross, who does address social and economic rights in his work. See Gross, supra note 5.)
Ignoring these issues is in keeping with a general privileging in the area of human rights law of civil and political
rights over social economic and cultural rights. See, e.g., Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility:
Identifying Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 81 (1998). As is
noted by the Governance Resource Centre (GRC) of the U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID),
“The transitional justice literature focuses almost exclusively on addressing past civil and political human rights
violations and war crimes.” GOVERNANCE RESOURCE CENTER, SAFETY SECURITY, AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Jo
Crichton ed.) at http://www.grc-exchange.org/g_themes/ssaj_transitionaljustice.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
Three recent works address socio-economic rights in the context of transitional justice; RAMA MANI, BEYOND
RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR (2002); JANE ALEXANDER, A SCOPING STUDY OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND POVERTY REDUCTION, FINAL REPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (2003), available at http://www.grc-exchange.org/docs/SSAJ56.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); and
Gross, supra note 5, at 49, 82-92, 92-96. See also Christopher J. Roederer, ‘Living Well is the Best Revenge’ – If
One Can, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 75 (1999).
12
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relatively clear in the cases of unjust takings of property and unfair labor/employment practices.
Here restitution and affirmative action/employment equity policies are clearly mandated.
However, to the extent that it is now the accepted wisdom that the communist (or state
socialist) project is unviable and that democratic transitions are about liberalization then largescale redistribution in the economic sphere is often seen as antithetical to the transition and its
goals. The liberal approach is to leave this to the “private sphere” and to private law (e.g.
contracts, torts, family law and business law). If one thinks of the project of democratization as
being the equivalent of liberalization then it is no mystery why the bulk of the private sphere and
private law are left out of the equation.14 Liberalization is about getting the government out of
the private sphere: privatizing, deregulating, and returning to the post of a neutral referee in the
“free-market” economy.15
This is particularly apt in the context of South Africa where, under apartheid, the areas of
contract and torts (delict) were considered to be very liberal, if not libertarian.16 If this is so, then
one might be forgiven for thinking that there is no need to transform these areas of the common
law.17

What is needed is to dismantle the old public law system and to transform the

14

See, e.g., Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992) (viewing
the right to democracy almost entirely from the thin liberal perspective. But see Susan Marks, The End of History?
Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 449 (1997) (criticizing the view that one can
equate democracy with liberalism); Gross, supra note 5, at 50, 52-3.(criticizing transitional justice theory that
confines itself to the liberal framework).
15
Note that “In our Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed until after the liberal society and the
liberal state were firmly established. Democracy came as a top dressing. It had to accommodate itself to the soil that
had already been prepared by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market society, and by the operation of
the liberal state, which served that society through a system of competing though not democratic political parties. It
was the liberal state that was democratized, and in the process, democracy was liberalized.” C.B. MACPHERSON,
THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 5 (1966).
16
I defend this view below.
17
As I argue below, this assumption is misguided.
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Constitution, criminal justice system, and administration, as well as to provide for prosecutions,
truth and reconciliation, reparations and perhaps some affirmative action.18
For reasons that will be clear below, I do not think that Teitel’s questions are adequate for
the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. “Commitment to the rule of law” has not been,
nor should it be, the main focus of South African society in completing its transition and
consolidating its democracy.19 As the South African experience shows, there are many legal acts
with transformative significance that are outside of the public law. Post-apartheid law in South
Africa embodies a somewhat unique deconstruction of the public/private split which is so
entrenched in liberal thought.20 The goal has not been merely to create a “liberal order.” The
Constitution not only contains the foundational value of the rule of law, but also the values of
achieving equality, dignity, the advancement of human rights and freedoms as well as nonracialism and non-sexism.21 In addition to having a number of socio-economic rights provisions,
the Constitution also allows for its extensive set of rights (set forth in the Bill of Rights) to apply

18

As if giving the victims the rough equivalent of forty acres and a mule along with their civil and political rights
will solve everything.
19
This point is argued in Christopher J. Roederer, Post-matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of
Values in South African Law, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 57 (2003) [hereinafter Roederer, Post-matrix]. Frank
Michelman argues that the coupling of the supremacy clause with the rule of law in section 1(c) of the Constitution
(“Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”), along with the other values of section 1, means that “’the rule
of law’ signifies not just the rule of rules but the rule of justice, as the Final Constitution envisions justice.
‘Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law’ signifies the unity of the legal system in the service of
transformation by, under, and according to law.” Frank Michelman, The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy
of the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 11-38 (S. Woolman et al eds., 2d ed.,
forthcoming 2005).
20
Germany also has a similar value-based approach to their “basic law” that cuts across the public and private law
divide. See Hector L. MacQueen, Delict, Contract, and the Bill of Rights: A Perspective from the United Kingdom,
121(2) S. AFR. L.J. 359, 361-62 (2005) (noting the 1958 Lüth decision of Germany’s federal constitutional court,
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 7, 198 (F.R.G.) (establishing indirect horizontal
application of the Basic Law to private law)). MacQueen also notes the similarity between South Africa and former
Communist Eastern European countries that have adopted the direct application of their constitutional rights to the
private law. Id. at 362 (referring to Olha Cherednychenko, Human Rights and Private Law, 10 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
& COMP. L. 301 (2003)). See also Hector MacQueen, Human Rights and Private Law in Scotland: A Response to
President Barak, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 363 (2003).
21
S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) [hereinafter Final Constitution] ch. 1 (Founding Provisions), § 1. Act
108 of 1996 is referred to generally as the “Final Constitution.”
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to the private sphere – i.e. to natural and juristic persons.22 Further, the Constitution mandates
that every development of the private common law must promote the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights.23 Thus, South African law allows for the transformation of the private law
to take place in harmony with the broader transformation of the public law.
It is crucial to establish whether delict was infected by the apartheid cancer and/or if it
failed to meet the needs of South African society, as this will provide a baseline from which to
evaluate the extent to which delict has changed or should change in order to meet the present
needs of society.24
However, to stop here would be to look at delict and private law in isolation from the
broader changes that have taken place in other areas of the law. The question remains: Even if
the private law was not infected by apartheid, given the broader changes that have taken place
and the needs, values and aspirations of the transition, is the private law, and delict in particular,
changing enough to meet these needs, values and aspirations? Is it furthering or hindering the
transformation.
Rather than surveying the entire history of delict under apartheid, a reasonable place to
start is the final decade of apartheid. The analysis will begin with a sympathetic view of that
decade in the work of Peter Kutner and then will continue with a significantly less sympathetic
view. In 1992, Peter Kutner published an article on the top ten “tort” cases from the Appellate
22

“A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that it is applicable,
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the right.” S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108
of 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 8(2).
23
“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal
or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 2
(Bill of Rights), § 39(2). Note that legislation includes the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of
1996). This is not to say that the law or the Constitution can solve all of South Africa’s problems or eliminate all the
vestiges of apartheid. Heinz Klug reminds us that most of the country’s wealth, which is concentrated in companies,
mines, stocks, bonds, and urban housing, has not been affected by redistribution efforts. HEINZ KLUG,
CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM, AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 138 (2000).
24
For instance, Jonathan Burchell has claimed that “delict is dynamic — it can, and does, develop to meet the needs
of a changing society.” JONATHAN BURCHELL, PRINCIPLES OF DELICT, at v (1992).
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Division of South Africa.25 That piece focused on the contribution made by South African courts
to the development of the “common law.” Kutner’s thesis was that since 1910, the Supreme
Court of South Africa had made significant contributions to the common law, yet to that day (the
early 1990s) those contributions had gone unnoticed by common law jurisdictions.
This was a brave study to undertake in the last decade of apartheid and there have not
been any similar studies done in American journals on the changes in the law of tort/ delict in
South Africa since.26 Much has changed since then: the release of Nelson Mandela, an Interim
and Final Constitution, as well as two democratic elections – in short – a decade of democracy.
There is no question that along with these changes came a transformation, if not a revolution, of
South African public law.27 But the question remains: What of the private law? According to
some commentators, like Kutner, one should not expect a radical transformation of delict in postapartheid South Africa. As he stated in his conclusion:

The validity and significance of such research is not impaired by the major
constitutional and political changes on the horizon in South Africa. In tort law and
numerous other fields, one should expect a large measure of continuity with the
past, not radical alteration of substantive law or applicable legal philosophy. Also,
cases pre-dating any legislative alteration of the law will retain their validity as
precedents for common law. 28
25

Peter Kutner, Tort Cases in the South African Appellate Division: A Top Ten of the Eighties, 6 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 311 (1992) [hereinafter Kutner, Top Ten] (Decisions from the appellate division were cited as “A.D.” or
simply “A,” but are now cited as “S.C.A.,” the Supreme Court of Appeals). It should be noted at the outset that
Kutner’s purpose was to show that South African “torts” was not out of step with common law jurisdictions in
general. His article drew on a more substantial project that culminated in COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA:
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND TORTS PRECEDENTS (1990) [hereinafter KUTNER, COMMON LAW]. He was largely
successful in the endeavor, and in fact if any system was out of step with general trends in the common law it was
the U.S., rather than South Africa. The differences in purpose between our projects should be taken to temper any
criticism of his work below.
26
Vivien Goldberg has written a short piece on the effect of the new Constitution on family law in South Africa in
South Africa: Private Law in Transition/Effect of the New Constitution, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 495 (1995).
27
J. DE WAAL ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 2 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DE WAAL ET AL, HANDBOOK
4TH] (describing the constitutional changes in South Africa as a “Legal Revolution”).
28
Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 363. This last statement was premature as all pre-constitutional precedent is
brought into question by the Final Constitution. See Roederer, Post –matrix, supra note 19, at 61. See also DE
WAAL ET AL., HANDBOOK 4TH, supra note 27, at 325 n.62 (stating, “…the pre-constitutional judgements were
decided without reference to the Bill of Rights and are no longer binding.”). But see Afrox Health Care Bpk v.
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The view that the private common law would not be seriously affected by the oncoming
democratic transition must be based on the notion it was not in need of transformation at the end
of apartheid.29 There may be a number of reasons for this view, all of which are problematic,
including: (1) apartheid law was not as evil as is commonly thought; (2) even if apartheid law
was evil, the evil laws of apartheid were largely confined to public law legislation; (3) apartheid
judges remained (largely) neutral and independent of the apartheid state; (4) private common law
tends to work itself pure30 regardless of the political context in which it is situated.31
Kutner claims that the main impact of apartheid on private law was a lack of access to the
political power necessary to initiate changes to doctrine and to the administration of law.32 This
underestimates the case-by-case distortions that may have taken place in the administration of
“justice” in both public and private law matters.33 Even if the law was neutral on its face it could

Strydom, 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at 27-29 (holding that the High Court was bound under the doctrine of stare decisis
by pre-constitutional apartheid judgments unless there was either a direct conflict with the Constitution or if the preconstitutional decision was based on policy considerations such as boni mores or the public interest (e.g. in cases
involving the issue of wrongfulness). See S. Woolman & D. Brand, Is There a Constitution in This Courtroom?:
Constitutional Jurisdiction After Afrox and Walters, 18 S. AFR. PUB. L. 37 (2003) (providing a sustained critical
appraisal of the judgment). Although not clearly overruling Afrox, the case of N. K. v. Minister of Safety & Security
has brought into question the existence of any case that would fall in the ground carved out by the Supreme Court of
Appeal (between direct conflict and policy based decisions) as being governed by apartheid stari decisis. CCT
52/04 para. 22 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) ( O’Regan, J. ) (calling into question whether any area of the law can be said to be
free of policy considerations and thereby insulated from the reach of constitutional values), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04.
29
‘Private common law’ is used to distinguish it from public common law, e.g. criminal law. South Africans use the
term common law in the same way we do. See Final Constitution, §§ 8, 39.
30
The phrase "the common law works itself pure" is Lord Mansfield's. According to Harold J. Berman the
expression was first articulated by Lord Mansfield as solicitor general in the case of Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atkyns
21, 33 (K.B. 1744) (shortened version reported in 22 Eng. Rep. 339). Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 Yale L.J. 1651, 1712 n.163 (1994).
31
U.S. common law originated under undemocratic conditions in England and flourished in this country for the
greater part of its history under undemocratic conditions. At best, we became a democracy in 1920 with women’s
suffrage, but realistically, it was not until the 1960s that we had a system that was worthy of the title “democracy.”
It is unclear if we have yet become a democratic state. As George W. Bush stated in an interview on the prospects
for democracy in Iraq, “…we're now saying, democracy must flourish. And as I recall from my history, it took us
quite a while here in the United States, but nevertheless we are making progress." Interview by Tim Russert, NBC,
Meet the Press (Feb. 7, 2004), available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618/ (last visited on Jul. 4, 2005).
32
Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 312.
33
Is it credible to suppose that equal justice would be dispensed in a courtroom that segregated “European”
practitioners from “non-European” practitioners? Chief Justice Steyn, upheld the practice of segregating the
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always be applied to the facts in a discriminatory manner.34 This also begs the question as to
what changes South Africans would have made if the majority had such access. Kutner’s focus
is on cases he considers important for comparative purposes, yet he never evaluates the larger
picture of which cases were not being heard, or what developments had not taken place.35
While the private common law of South Africa was not poisoned by apartheid to the
same degree as were areas of public law, South African private law was nonetheless distorted,
and at the very least its development was arrested under apartheid. Although Kutner does not
see it or acknowledge it, even his selected cases show signs of arrested development. This
failure to see the adverse effects of apartheid in the area of private law evidences a failure to
completely understand how apartheid functioned, how the authoritarian public law worked in
concert with the libertarian private law to further the harms of apartheid.
Kutner notes three reasons for the neglect of the South African law of delict among
common law countries. The most obvious, although not most important, reason has to do with
problems of language (i.e., the percentage of judgments and academic literature written in
Afrikaans, a derivation of Dutch) and accessibility.36 However, as more and more of these
materials have become readily available in English and over the internet, this problem has
courtroom so that “non-European” practitioners would have to represent their clients from a different table than that
used by “European” practitioners. R. v. Pitje, 1960 (4) SA 709 (A) (Appellate Division). This sent a clear message
“that the highest court of the land did not perceive a black lawyer as equal before the law.” DAVID DYZENHAUS,
TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER 156 (1998).
34
Cases are not heard by juries in South Africa, not even in criminal matters after the Abolition of Juries Act 34 of
1969 (BSRSA) (S. Afr.).
35
In fact he fails to mention one of the worst cases of apartheid, Pakendorf v. DeLamingh, 1982 (3) SA 146 (A).
Kutner exclude the case because it was based on the Roman-Dutch legal principles (personal communication with
author). Prior to Pakendorf the delict of defamation required the intentional infringement of a person’s good name.
NEETHLING ET AL., LAW OF DELICT 338, 348 (J.C. Knoble trans. & ed., 4th ed. 2001). After Pakendorf, media
defendants (owners, publishers, printers and editors of newspapers) were held strictly liable unless they could
establish that the publication was both true and in the public interest. This case is a classic example of the judiciary
supporting the apartheid policy of silencing the media by making it much more risky for the media to publish
anything critical of the apartheid government. Interestingly, Neethling et al. blame the influence of English law for
leading the courts down the path to this deviant approach to defamation. Id. at 348.
36
There are still a significant number of cases reported in Afrikaans, about five percent or so over the last five years
in the area of delict.
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significantly diminished.37 The more substantial reasons for the neglect are caused by the
perception that since South African law is based on Roman-Dutch law, comparisons or lessons
are not fruitful; the discussion is about different kinds of fruit from different kinds of trees.
Secondly, even if the discussion is not about apples and oranges but only apples, even if the fruit
were comparable, South African law, from the late 1940s to the early 1990s was grossly
distorted by apartheid. To make the point somewhat more forcefully than Kutner, the fruit was
poisoned or rotten. No one wants to look to the rotten apple for lessons on how to develop or
perfect the common law. Few if any academics or judges writing in the 1980s would want to
cite South African decisions as providing good lessons or insights into the common law for
adoption in their jurisdiction, even if good lessons were there to draw from.
Although obstacles to Kutner’s argument for relevance, these are not obstacles for us.
Let it suffice to say that anyone who is familiar with torts should be able to understand, with
some difficulty, the average delict case. Although some would see the constitutionalization of
the private law of delict as making it less appropriate for comparisons to the common law of
torts, this development leads to some of the most interesting opportunities for comparing and
contrasting the law of delict with our law of torts. Even if it is difficult to compare and contrast
particular doctrinal rules it is very fruitful to compare and contrast the larger trends and changes
that have taken place along with the democratic transformation of South Africa

37

All Constitutional Court cases and most Supreme Court of Appeal cases are reported in English. Juta publishes
English translations of South African cases reported in Afrikaans, although they are about two years behind. There
remains a number of journals that are predominately Afrikaans, but more and more Afrikaans academics are
publishing in English. For instance, LAW OF DELICT, NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, was originally written in
Afrikaans as DELICTREG (4th ed. 2001). Judgments of the Constitutional Court from 1995 until the present are
available online at http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgment.php?case_id=12717 (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) and those of
the Supreme Court of Appeal from 1999 to the present are available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/index.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). Both these and other links to South
African law are hosted by the University of the Witwatersrand School of Law website at http://www.law.wits.ac.za.
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In Part II I argue that even if the private common law of South Africa was not infected by
the apartheid cancer, it acted as a carrier and facilitator of apartheid values and policies,
perpetuating the inequities of apartheid. In Part III I evaluate Peter Kutner’s top ten cases from
the 1980s and demonstrate that there is evidence of the cancer even in his chosen cases.
Evidence of infection is rife when we turn to an evaluation of what was missing from the record
in Part IV. Here I show that the development of the law of delict was arrested under apartheid in
that a number of progressive developments that took place in the United States during this period
did not occur in South Africa. I also show that numerous developments have occurred in these
areas since the fall of apartheid. In Part V, I argue that even if parts of the law of delict were not
infected by the apartheid cancer, the values that animated the law of delict under apartheid are
inconsistent with the values, goals and aspirations of the democratic transformation of South
Africa. Part V details both the values of the democratic transformation as well as the
constitutional mechanisms for the harmonization of delict with those values. Part VI details
several developments in the law of delict beyond those mentioned in Part IV. In sum, the
transformation of South Africa has helped propel the transformation of delict, and this in turn has
added fuel to the transformation, helping to further consolidate South Africa’s democracy.
II.

THE CANCER OF APARTHEID: HOW SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATE LAW CARRIED AND SPREAD
THE INFECTION EVEN IF IT DID NOT CONTRACT THE DISEASE

As noted, the second substantive problem Kutner addressed was the question of how much
apartheid tainted, distorted, or thwarted the common law of delict. His answer is that although
apartheid may have had a serious impact on public law, he does not believe it had such an impact
on private law, particularly the law of delict.38 Further, he did not believe that the impending
democratic changes would radically alter the law of delict. As he stated, “In all probability, a
38

Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 311.
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democratic South Africa will maintain and refine the tort law it has inherited, not radically alter
it.”39
Kutner is not alone in thinking that the apartheid cancer was primarily confined to public
law and some legislative inroads into the private law.40 While Kutner’s position is not facially
ideological, given the context in which he was writing, it is difficult avoid the ideological
presuppositions and potential impact that such a position entails.
A.

The Apartheid Cancer and the Role of Judges
One reason for thinking that the apartheid cancer did not infect the common law might be

based on the notion of separation of powers, and the relative independence of the judiciary from
the political branches. This was a hotly debated issue in South Africa during the 1980s. The
South African debate over how far the apartheid cancer had spread and the role of judges in such
a system was started by Raymond Wacks,41 and it drew responses from several prominent jurists
in South Africa.42
In Wacks’s view, judges working under the apartheid system should have resigned
because it was not possible for them to faithfully carry out their duties as judges and to dispense
actual justice at the same time. Wacks’s argument was based on the principled effect that

39

Id. at 312.
P.J. Visser states:
The current law of delict is the result of developments spanning thousands of years in order to
achieve a just balance between various interests by providing remedies when specific requirements
are met. The bill of rights must not be seen as a system aimed at replacing the current law of
delict. In practical terms, this means that the constitution must generally be used sparingly and
wisely in changing and developing the content and scope of the law of delict.
P.J. Visser, Some Remarks on the Relevance of the Bill of Rights on the Law of Delict, TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUIDAFRIKAANSE REG [Journal of South African Law] 529, 536 (1998).
41
Raymond Wacks, Judges and Injustice, Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the University of Natal, Durban (Mar. 23,
1983), in 101 S. AFR. L.J. 266 (1984) and SUNDAY TRIBUNE, March 27, 1983 [hereinafter Wacks, Judges and
Injustice].
42
E. Mureinik’s views can be found in Dworkin and Apartheid, in LAW AND SOCIAL PRACTICE (Hugh Corder ed.
1988) [hereinafter Mureinik, Dworkin]. John Dugard wrote his response in Should Judges Resign? – A Reply to
Professor Wacks, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1984). This inspired DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL
SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1991).
40
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apartheid should have on the entire system and not so much on the actual spread of the apartheid
cancer. His argument was also based on Ronald Dworkin’s notion of law as integrity,43 the idea
that judges have institutional duties to decide like cases in a like manner. Every hard case, every
development of the common law, would need to take place against the background of the
principles that justified the system. The more unjust the system, the more clear it is that the only
principles that justify the unjust system are unjust principles. Thus, if one is a judge in a wicked
legal system then there is little that she can do to bring justice to that system without abandoning
her duties to the system.44 Few judges took up Wacks’s call to resign,45 perhaps because they
were comforted by the responses of commentators such as Eteine Mureinik who persuasively
argued that judges could do justice within the system and that resigning was less honorable than
doing what they could within the system.46 Some, no doubt, did not resign because they
supported the apartheid system. Which path was the most honorable depended both on how the
judge’s role was to be perceived and just how far, wide and deep the evil cancer had spread.

43

R. Wacks, supra note 41 at 282; R. WACKS, LAW, MORALITY AND THE PRIVATE DOMAIN 58 (2000).
According to Dworkin, the judges’ choices then are to either protest, lie, or resign. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 326-27 (1978).
45
In 1987 Justice L. W. H. Ackermann, now a Justice on the Constitutional Court, did resign to take up a chair in
Human Rights. Is it possible to conceive the resignation of Justice Rex van Schalkwyk’s in 1996 as a result of
affirmative action on the bench and the release of certain prisoners as also a response to Wacks’s call? See Wacks,
Judges and Injustice, supra note 41, at 6 n.22 (noting the resignation).
46
As Mureinik said:
44

If there is no point in being a conscientious judge, there is no point in being a conscientious
advocate, because the arguments of a conscientious advocate are calculated to persuade only
conscientious judges... And if there is no point in being a conscientious judge or a conscientious
advocate or a conscientious attorney, there can be little point in being a conscientious academic
lawyer, because the most important kind of legal research is addressed to conscientious judges and
practitioners, and teaching is a worthless activity unless it is addressed to conscientious students;
and there can be no point in being a conscientious law student, because you would be preparing
yourself for nothing.
Mureinik, Dworkin, supra note 42, at 183.
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While it is clear that apartheid was evil and that the new South African legal system is to
be founded on values that are opposed to the evils of apartheid, the extent and depth of the evil is
in no sense settled. As the late Justice Mahomed stated in S. v. Makwanyane:

The South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is
defensible and represents a decisive break from and ringing rejection of, that part
of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular and repressive, and
a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic,
caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly articulated in the
Constitution.47
While there were many clear cases where the laws and policies needed to be reversed, the
question of how far and deep the cancer spread into the common law remains controversial.
How much of it affected the way that the judge’s role was conceived, of the way that judges
reasoned (and often continue to reason) about the law?

B.

Did the cancer spread into the common law?
In a recent article Jeremy Sarkin asks whether the common law in South Africa was pro-

apartheid or pro-democracy?48 His conclusion appears to be that it was pro-apartheid as he
stated:
To conclude, in the majority of cases during the apartheid era, Parliament
rode roughshod over the common law rights to individual liberty.49 The courts
generally served as a rubber stamp for the legislature as they upheld and
sanctioned government encroachment on personal freedom.
Therefore, while it is obvious that the common law had strands that were
compatible with human rights, the statutory laws of apartheid in South Africa
overwhelmed the common law. Consequently, the residual common law rights
were of minimal effect.50

47

1995 (3) SA 391 para. 262 (CC).
Jeremy Sarkin, The Common Law in South Africa: Pro Apartheid or Pro Democracy?, 23 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 1 (1999).
49
In support of this proposition Sarkin refers to M.G. Cowling, Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South
Africa: Articulating the Inarticulate Premise, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 169 (1995). Id. at 11 n.54.
50
Id. at 11-12.
48
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This conclusion needs clarification in a number of respects. First, Sarkin is not concerned with
the general concept of democracy, but merely individual rights based democracy or liberalism.51
It would be more appropriate to say that he was asking whether or not judges during the
apartheid era were willing and able to protect individual rights against the apartheid cancer. The
answer to that question was mixed, for he does provide some evidence that at least certain judges
were willing and able to use common law presumptions and remedies to counteract, read down,
or narrowly construe apartheid legislation that adversely affected individual rights.52 David
Dyzenhaus refers to these principles as fundamental principles of legality; principles that are part
of the inner logic of the law or part of the fundamental building blocks of the rule of law.53

51

Sarkin rephrases the question as: “The role of the legislature and the courts during the apartheid years needs to be
examined to determine whether the supposed libertarian strands were upheld or whether it was the common law that
permitted the apartheid system to trample on the rights of the majority.” Id. at 6.
52
The tools at the judges disposal included: natural justice (due process), equality before the law, impartiality, the
audi alteram partem rule, the in favorem libertatis (in favor of liberty) presumption, the right to bring a writ of
Habeus Coprus, the presumption that the legislature does not intend to change the existing law more than is
necessary, and that it does not intend to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. Id at 3-4. Sarkin refers to an emerging
consciousness among judges in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the legal system was perceived to be a part of the
apartheid machinery of oppression. Id. at 7 (referring to The Hoexter Commission Report (1984); the Human
Sciences Research Report of 1985, and JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER
487 (1978)). One justice, Justice A.J. Milne, went so far as to claim that:
Judges must bring certain presumptions to bear in . . . interpreting the legislature's intention. They
look at precedent and what can only be called the general inherited spirit of our laws. It is here that
I find the Universal Declaration of Human Rights particularly interesting reading. A great many of
the fundamental presumptions that guide our interpretation of what the legislature intended are
contained in the Declaration.
Id. at 7-8. (quoting Justice A.J. Milne, Address to Lawyers for Human Rights (Aug. 6, 1983), in 3 Law &
Hum. Rts. Bull. 48 (1984)).
53
DYZENHAUS, supra note 33, at 151. In addition to the principles stated above, his list includes the presumption
that policy should be implemented in a reasonable or non-discriminatory fashion, that if legislation requires that an
official must have a reason to believe x before acting, the official should be required to provide reasons or evidence
to justify the belief, and that legislation giving sweeping powers must be defensible in a court on the basis that the
reasons or purpose stated for the legislation must be demonstrated to exist and the means or powers invoked for
achieving the stated purpose must be related to the purpose. Id. Dyzenhaus’ notion of the inner logic of law follows
the notion as developed by L. Lon Fuller, in Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630-672 (1958).
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Despite some positive evidence, the bulk of the evidence is of judges failing to use
common law remedies and presumptions and seemingly rubber stamping apartheid legislation.54
Further, when judges failed to toe the line, the state responded with clearer, more pervasive
security legislation55 as well as by packing the Appellate division.56
While it is true that apartheid had a clearly detrimental effect on the common law, the
effect as captured by Sarkin, and to some degree Dyzenhaus, was primarily in the area of public
common law, or the vertical relationship between the State and the individual. Sarkin’s cases all
involve the State, be it the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Law and Order, the Minister of
Prisons, or the Minister of Native Affairs. Sarkin does not look at the horizontal relation
between individuals within the state. Thus it may still be maintained that, even though the State
and the judiciary were not pro-democracy but were pro-apartheid in cases of vertical conflict,
54

In Rossouw v. Sachs, Justice Thompson read Act 37 of 1963 purposely to fill in the gap in the Act which made it
unclear whether the appellant was empowered by the Act to make regulations depriving the plaintiff, advocate
Sachs, of reading and writing materials. 1964 (2) SA 551 (A). Given that the purpose of the section in question was
to compel the detainee to speak, Justice Ogilvie Thompson read the Act as denying any right of detainees to “relieve
the tedium of their detention with reading and writing material.” Id. at 564-65. Dyzenhaus lends fuel to this concern
in his analysis of the legal community’s role in the apartheid ‘order’ and their avoidance of confronting that role in
the Legal Hearing before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. DYZENHAUS, supra note 33. He is particularly
critical of the judiciary and charges it with a dereliction of duty. See id. ch. 4.3.
55
The Internal Security Act 74 (1982) was passed in response to the Rabie Commission of Inquiry. Rabie was the
Chief Justice of South Africa during the 1980s. The report addressed the various inadequacies of existing
legislation. See John Dugard, “A Triumph for Executive Power – An Examination of the Rabie Report and Internal
Security Act 74 of 1982,” 99 S. AFR. L.J. 589 (1982). The above presumptions could be overridden by “clear”
legislation to that effect. South African judges learned early on that they did not have the authority of judicial
review outside of cases involving procedural irregularity. In 1895 Chief Justice Kotze attempted to introduce
American style judicial review in the Transvaal. This resulted in his dismissal by President Paul Kruger, who stated
that, “the testing right is a principle of the devil." Charles Villa-Vicencio, Whither South Africa?: Constitutionalism
and Law Making, 40 EMORY L.J. 141, 150 (1991) (citing JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 24 (1978).
56
Dyzenhaus aptly notes that the packing of the court was presaged by the appointment of L.C. Steyn to the bench
in 1951. DYZENHAUS, supra note 33, at 154. Steyn’s appointment is worth noting because he was appointed from
the civil service rather from senior council at the bar, which was unusual and he was appointed a few years after the
publishing of his book on statutory interpretation, DIE UTLEG VAN WETTE (1946), in which he strongly criticized the
use of common law presumptions (the principles above). His appointment to the Appellate Division came with the
1955 court-packing, where the Appellate Division was enlarged from six to eleven members and a quorum of all
eleven was required to determine the validity of a statute. Id. (referring to the Appellate Division Quorum Act
1955). For a critical evaluation of the impact of L.C. Steyn on South African Law see E. Cameron, Legal
Chauvinism, Executive-Mindedness and Justice – L.C. Steyn’s Impact on South African Law 99 S. AFR. L.J. 38
(1982). L.C. Steyn embodied Wacks’ worry about what would happen if judges did not resign. Chief Justice Rabie,
who took over the role of Chief Justice in the 1980s, was no better than Steyn. DYZENHAUS, supra note 33, at 158.
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this did not affect the judiciary carrying out its common law functions in cases of horizontal
conflict, conflict between individuals.
This fits in with Kutner’s analysis of the law of delict in the 1980s. He did not find any
of the cases to be horribly out of step with common law developments elsewhere. Although
some of the cases he surveyed could be considered “good” cases that made valuable
contributions to the common law, a number of the cases he positively reviewed were anything
but progressive. A number of them evidence a libertarian bias, which is evidenced by a bias
towards contracts over delict or over tort. At least one of the cases endorses gender-based
discrimination and/or discrimination on the basis of marital status. More importantly, his survey
does not include any analysis of what is missing from the law of delict in the 1980s.
It is not surprising that areas of private law like delict, which deal primarily with the
relations between individuals rather than between individuals and the State, would not be as
clearly and thoroughly tainted by apartheid. In many cases, the principles which underlay this
authoritarian, racist regime did not have a clear impact on relations between relatively equally
situated parties (for instance two corporations or two white male professionals).57 In fact, under
apartheid the private law operated under a veneer of libertarianism which is the antithesis of
authoritarianism. Looking only on the surface, one may be forgiven for thinking that the private
law tradition in South Africa was not tainted by the authoritarian regime. But if one cuts through
the surface it becomes clear that it was tainted. This is so in part because South Africa operated
as a severely truncated liberal democracy. This truncated democracy allowed for the use of the
rhetoric of libertarianism and the rule of law while that very libertarianism empowered the
private sector to further the authoritarian and racist apartheid mandate. The system worked

57

The apartheid system was also sexist, heterosexist, and relatively unsympathetic to those with disabilities.
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efficiently to this end in part because of the veneer of libertarianism, democracy and the rule of
law. Liberty is exalted in the common law with a bias towards freedom of contract over notions
of social responsibility (i.e. contract over delict). Individuals are presumed to be free and equal
and fully able to determine their own legal relationships under the state enforced law of
contracts. People are expected to take their hard knocks in the risky world (or to protect
themselves against them). Apartheid defined many of the parameters within which injustice
could flourish – and flourish under the protection of the State. On the one hand, the apartheid
laws provided a protective arena for white domination and consequently black oppression; while
on the other hand they provided springboards for further domination and oppression.
Alfred Cockrell, in The Hegemony of Contract,58 has persuasively argued that the law of
contract occupied a position of privilege in South African law and that “its supremacy has served
to check the expansionist ambitions of rival compartment of law.”59 Cockrell surveys the
hegemony of contract over a number of areas of the law including delict.60 He even notes that
some commentators have maintained that contract law was insulated from the fundamental rights
in the Interim Constitution.61
In the second half of his article Cockrell looks at the justifications for this hegemony and
finds them in the following ideas:
Liberty is the prime political virtue, and coercion is prima facie an evil. The law
should be reluctant to impose affirmative duties on individuals unless those duties
have been voluntarily assumed. Since individuals are the best assessors of their
private desires and preferences, legal rules should create the maximum free space
58

115 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1998).
Id. at 286.
60
In the section dealing with delict, Cockrell deals primarily with the Lillicrap decision, 1983 2 SA 157
(Witwatersrand Local Div.). See infra Section V for an extensive treatment of the case. He also surveys unjust
enrichment, estoppel by representation, and administrative law.
61
Cockrell refers by example to J. D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Free Speech and the Law of Defamation, 112 S.
AFR. L.J. 572, 577 (1995) (arguing that contracts “cannot be tested against the provisions of the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights in the interim Constitution”). Id. at 303 n.104.
59
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to allow for the satisfaction of those wants…Finally, the court’s role is an
essentially facilitative one of giving effect to the wishes of the parties.62
This idea is echoed by the authors of the leading South African book on the law of delict
when they state that, “The fundamental premise in law is that damage (harm) rests where it falls,
that is each person must bear the damage he suffers (res perit domino).”63 In other words, the
hegemony of contract is based on the idea that the values of arm’s length dealings in the market
should triumph over values of “neighborliness,”64 and of the “political community.”65 We are
fundamentally individuals who compete in a marketplace rather than good neighbors who are
expected to help each other out or who are expected to cooperate in the greater good of our
political community.

This libertarian view of the legal system was couched within the

authoritarian apartheid regime. The result is in many ways the best of both worlds for the
privileged and the worst of both worlds for the disadvantaged.
Take an example of the law that Cockrell does not mention, but which was also
dominated by the “free market” values of contract, namely -- employment or labor law.66 Under
apartheid black workers were excluded from collective bargaining under the Labour Relations
Act 28 of 1956, and were instead subjected to a committee system under the Bantu Labour
(Settlement of Disputes) Act 48 of 1953. Black unions were not afforded the same legal
protection and benefits that white unions were given. Employers were not required to recognize
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Id. at 309.
NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 3 (emphasis in original) (referencing J.C. VAN DER WALT & J.R. MIDGLEY,
DELICT: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 19 (1997)).
64
Cockrell, supra note 58, at 311 (quoting from PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 478
(1991)).
65
Id. at 312.
66
The racially discriminatory labor policies of the late 1950s and early 1960s raised concerns for the International
Labor Organization (ILO) which did not subside with South Africa’s withdrawal in 1964. Between 1964 and 1979
the ILO compiled twenty-two reports and made a number of resolutions regarding the unfair labor practices of South
Africa. David Woolfrey, The Application of International Labour Norms to South African Law, 12 S. AFR. Y.B.
INT’L L. 135, 140 (1986-1987). See also MARTIN BRASSEY, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR LAW VOL. I A1:36-42
(1998) (providing a concise history of South African labor law from 1948 – 1977).
63
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the black unions and as a result they were able to harass and victimize those who attempted to
exercise their rights to association (such harassment often being assisted by the police). Further,
black workers were not allowed to strike under the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act
48 of 1953.67 Many jobs, especially skilled and semi-skilled jobs, were reserved for whites - for
example those under the Mines and Works Act 12 of 1911 and also the Conciliation Act 28 of
1956.68 The systematic racial discrimination in the workplace was further entrenched by the
absence of legislation providing for fair discipline and dismissal of workers. The plight of black
employees was worsened since they could be dismissed for any reason whatsoever under the
common law. Finally, the influx control and residential segregation laws placed black workers at
an even further disadvantage in the labor market.
The consequences of a system like this are predictable. The denial of access to legally
recognized trade unions and their bargaining power mixed with an extremely liberal regime for
discipline and dismissal resulted in a labor regime that systematically discriminated against black
workers, leading to an exploitative work environment.69 Dissatisfied workers had to either live
with their dissatisfaction or else participate in illegal strikes which often resulted in arrest and
detention coupled with mass dismissals.
It is not surprising that in such a system, the courts would not emphasize such concepts as
good faith and unconscienability in contracts70 and that they would be conservative when it came
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BRASSEY, supra note 66, at A1:38.
Id.; Woolfrey, supra note 66, at 141.
69
For instance, in 1967 the average monthly wage for a white mine employee was R282 while it was only R17 for a
black employee. John Dugard, The legal framework of apartheid, in SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE 89 n.46 (N.J.
Rhoodie ed., 1972) (citing SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, A SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN
SOUTH AFRICA 104 (1968)).
70
Gerhard Lubbe, Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously: The Bill of Rights and Its Implications for the
Development of Contract Law, 121 S. Afr. J. L. 385 (2004) (referring to two post apartheid cases that rejected the
notion of a good faith defense to contract law: Brisley v. Drotsky, 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (involving the contractual
requirement that all variations to the contract be in writing and signed) and Afrox Health Care Bpk v. Strydom, 2002
(6) SA 21 (SCA) (involving an exemption of liability clause in the contract)). In Brisley, the Court held that there
68
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to expanding tort or delictual liability. They might be expected to fail to include mechanisms
that make it more affordable to sue in delict or to make it easier to prove a claim in delict. This
greatly benefits those who have access to information, power and the ability to cover any losses
they may suffer, and greatly disadvantages those who do not. It allows the powerful who have
economic means to dictate the terms of contracts, and it binds those who sign or agree to the
contract through the sanctity of contract. Those who can afford to protect themselves in the risk
laden society have a great advantage over those who cannot.
In a society where people have relatively equal access to education, decent
accommodation, health care, food, water and income opportunities, the libertarian approach has
some attraction. But when one lives in a society that includes separate and radically unequal
opportunities based on apartheid legislation that runs the gamut from education laws, laws that
govern what jobs one can and cannot take, where one can live, what services one gets, etc.,71 the
freedom that is exalted in the private sphere is a ruse. It merely acts as a secondary source of
further inequality.

was “no general equitable discretion enabling a court to refuse to enforce a non-variation clause, or indeed any other
contractual provision, merely on the grounds of it being unreasonable, unconscionable or against good faith.” Id. at
397 (citing Brisley, 2002 (4) SA 1, 121 para. 12 (SCA). Lubbe further notes that this is contrary to the approach
taken in section 242 of the German BGB. Id. The Afrox court rejected the argument for the good faith defense.
2002 (6) SA 21, 41B para. 32 (SCA). Afrox left the door open for cases involving extreme unfairness which may
render a contract unenforceable due to public policy. Lubbe, supra, at 398-99 (citing Afrox, 2002 (6) SA 21, 34G-I
para. 10 (SCA)).
71
Further examples of these types of legislation include the Natives Land Act of 1913 (restricting black ownership
of land to thirteen percent of the territory); Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 (classifying South Africans as
Black, Coloured, Indian or White); Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (segregating cities and towns based on ‘racial’
categories); Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 (prohibiting marriage between the ‘races’); Immorality
Act 23 of 1957 (prohibiting sexual intercourse between races); Black Education Act 47 of 1953, Indians Education
Act 60 of 1965; Coloureds Education Act 47 of 1963 (segregating education for non-whites); Black (Urban Areas)
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945; Blacks (Abolition of Passes and co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952;
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951(requiring non-whites to carry pass books). For a representative list of
racist apartheid legislation, see e.g. J. de Waal, Constitutional Law, in INRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA
58 (C.G. van der Merwe & J. E. du Plessis eds., 2004).
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III.

EVIDENCE OF INFECTION: EVALUATING
CASES FROM THE 1980S

THE

RECORD

IN

KUTNER’S

TOP

TEN DELICT

As noted, Kutner reviewed what he considered to be the top ten cases in the law of delict in
South Africa during the last decade of apartheid. Of the ten cases reviewed by Kutner from the
1980s, most of them are sound cases that are still good law to this day. These include Union
National South British Insurance Co. v. Vitoria,72 General Accident Insurance Co. S.A. v.
Summers,73 Minister of Police v. Rabie,74 Dhlomo, N.O. v. Natal Newspapers (Pty.) Ltd.,75
Joubert v. Venter,76 Schultz v. Butt77 and even Siman & Co. (Pty) v. Barclays National Bank
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1982 1 SA 444 (AD), aff'g Vitoria v. Union Nat'l So. British Ins. Co., 1980 4 SA 406 (Transvaal Prov. Div.). In
Vitoria, the Appellate Division held that the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt amounted to contributory
negligence under Section 1 of the Apportionment of Damages Act. No. 34 of 1956 (S. Afr.). Id. at 460. Further, it
held that the award would only be reduced if it was shown that the injuries suffered were more severe than if the
seatbelt had been worn. See NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 143, 164 (proposing that this is still good law).
73
1987 3 SA 577 (AD), aff'g Summers v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., S.A., 1985 3 SA 418 (Cape Prov. Div.). Summers
involved the question of whether the discounting of a lump advance payment for future losses should start at the
date of the delict or the date of the judgment. The court held that damages for expenses and losses between the time
of the delict and trial should not be discounted and that discounting should run from the time of the trial onwards.
Gen. Accident Ins. Co. S.A. v. Summers, 1987 3 SA 615 (AD). See P.J. VISSER & J.M. POTGIETER, THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 132-33 (2d ed. 2003) (proposing that this is still good law).
74
1986 1 SA 117 (AD), aff'g Rabie v. Minister of Police, 1984 1 SA 786 (Witwatersrand Local Div.). Rabie held
the Minister of Police vicariously liable for the actions of an off duty police mechanic who wrongfully assaulted,
arrested and detained the plaintiff. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 377-79. See id. at 373-74, 377-79
(proposing that this is still good law). Notice that this is a relatively progressive case for the 1980s. Note that the
vicarious liability was introduced into South African law from English law. Id. at 373. P.Q.R. Boberg describes this
as “perhaps the most comprehensive and far-reaching innovation we have taken from English law.” P. Q. R.
Boberg, Oak Tree or Acorn?--Conflicting Approaches to Our Law of Delict, 83 S. AFR. L.J. 150, at 169 (1966).
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1989 1 SA 945 (AD), rev'g Dhlomo, N.O. v. Natal Newspapers (Pty.) Ltd., 1988 4 SA 63 (Durban Div.). The
Appellate Division held that non-trading corporations can bring defamation actions if the defamatory statement was
“…calculated to cause financial prejudice.” Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 342 n.339 (citing Dhlomo, 1989 1
SA at 954). See NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 329 (proposing that this is still good law).
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1985 1 SA 654 (AD). Joubert recognized a qualified privilege for defamatory statements made in the process of
litigation if the statements were made without improper motive, were relevant, and were supported by reasonable
grounds. Id. at 704-05. See NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 344 (proposing that this is still good law). Kutner
is slightly critical of this case in that he thinks the privilege should be wider, i.e., one that is closer to our common
law. See Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 349.
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1986 3 SA 667 (AD), aff'g Butt v. Schultz, 1984 3 SA 568 (E. Cape Div.). In Schultz, the Appellate division
found that the use of a competitor’s catamaran boat hull mould to make competing boats amounted to unlawful
competition. The trial court case at least partially relied on International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918). 1984 3 SA at 578. This was approved by the Appellate Division. 1986 3 SA at 682-83. See
NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 321 (proposing that this is still good law and describing the case as falling
under the misappropriation of a competitor’s performance). Kutner is critical of this case as International News has
had a mixed reaction in the U.S. and has not been adopted in common law jurisdictions outside the U.S. See Kutner,
Top Ten, supra note 25, at 352-53. There appears to be more recent U.S. Supreme Court authority that is contrary to
International News. See e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (involving the copying of a

23

Ltd.78 The remaining three cases are problematic from the standpoint of the transformation of
South African Law. Kutner either concurs with these cases or at least concurs in part with these
cases. To the extent that he dissents, he takes on a less progressive standpoint than the South
African Appellate Division itself. Reading his work one may have the impression that apartheid
delict was not all that bad. Given the arguments above, there is good reason to be skeptical of
this view. This section will more closely scrutinize some of the cases to determine if they were
not in fact tainted by apartheid. The next section will look beyond these few cases to the broader
context of the law in order to further demonstrate the breadth and depth of the apartheid cancer
in tort law. Throughout, I will be drawing on developments that occurred in the United States
but did not occur in South Africa.
A.

“Illegal” Income
Santam Insurance Ltd. v. Ferguson79 was brought by a widow claiming loss of support

and funeral expenses that resulted from the death of her spouse in a traffic accident.80 Santam
Insurance Ltd. defended the claim by arguing that the plaintiff’s spouse’s income was derived
from the illegal activity of operating an auto body shop without a license.81 In coming to its
decision, the trial court distinguished a case that barred recovery of lost income for a food
boat hull). Relying on Bonito, Kutner argues that the courts should not protect material that is not subject to
legislative copyright protection. Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 354. Finally, he thinks that allowing some
copying from the public domain is better for competition than forcing new entrants to “reinvent the boat” – so to
speak. Id. at 353. On this point, I am in agreement with Kutner. However, it is likely the case that this will be to
the disadvantage of less sophisticated designers who fail to register their designs as opposed to their more
sophisticated counterparts whose lawyers will do so as a matter of course.
78
1984 2 SA 888 (AD). This case involved the question of whether the failure of the defendant’s employee to
arrange cover against fluctuations in the rate of the South African Rand (its official currency) and the fact that the
employee erroneously stated to the plaintiff that cover could not be arranged was the cause of the plaintiff’s loss.
Since the defendant did not have a duty to provide the cover, and it was doubtful that the defendant could arrange
cover from another source on the Friday in question, the court held that the actions of the employee did not cause the
loss in question. Id. at 901, 905-07 (3-2 decision) (Nicholas, A.J.A, and Trollip, A.J.A., with concurrence by
Wessels, J.A.; Corbett, J.A. and Miller, J.A., dissenting). The strong dissents in this case make it less firm as
precedent than the cases above.
79
1985 4 SA 843(AD).
80
Id. at 845.
81
Id.
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hawker who operated without a license.82 The trial court further distinguished this case from
cases involving moral turpis such as robbery83 and awarded her damages for both her loss of
support and funeral costs.84 The Appellate Division overturned the ruling as to the loss of
support, but awarded her the funeral costs.85
Although Kutner notes the criticism of this case by South African academics86 and
registers his sympathy, he did not think it followed that the decision was wrong.87 As he stated,
“There is much to be said for the view that no benefit should be derived from unlawful activity –
by the lawbreaker or by anyone else; in assessing damages courts should put plaintiffs in the
position they would have been in had all persons conducted themselves lawfully.”88 As he
further stated:
[T]o conduct a trade without a license or in unsuitable places does, in many
instances, threaten the public health or safety. It is not necessarily a mere failure
to comply with a legal technicality or to surmount a bureaucratic hurdle. The
licensing requirement in Ferguson was no more of a technicality and no less
supported by considerations of the public interest and safety than the licensing
requirement in Dhlamini [the food hawker case].89
To his credit, Kutner does point out that the way around Ferguson is to either show that the
deceased had lawfully earned income before and would likely have earned lawful income after,
or to show that the legal infringement was not contrary to the “public interest.”90 This has been
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Dhlamini v. Protea Assurance Co., 1974 4 SA 906 (AD).
Id. at 208.
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Dhlamini, 1985 1 SA at 208-09.
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Santam Ins. Ltd., 1985 4 SA at 852.
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Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 321 (citing Mervyn Dendy, Damages for Loss of Support out of Illegally
Earned Income: Visiting the Sins of the Fathers, 104 S. AFR. L.J. 243 (1987)); see e.g., Roos & Clark, The Law of
Delict and the Illegal Breadwinner, 50 T.H.R.-H.R.91 (1987); P.Q.R. BOBERG, THE LAW OF DELICT: VOL. I
AQUILLIAN LIABILITY (1984, revised reprint 1989) at 591-94; A.K. Blommaert, Booysen v. Shield Insurance Co.,
1981 T.S.A.R. 176. Kutner does make the connection between apartheid and illegal income in another section of the
article. Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25 at 312, n2.
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captured as looking to the issues of one’s earning capacity (rather than lost income) and to public
policy.91
This allows for a great deal of flexibility, but that flexibility will either allow a judge to
avoid Ferguson or to bring more factual situations within its scope. If the court is unsympathetic
to the dependant and/or to the deceased it can find the activity contrary to the public interest and
find that the breadwinner had few prospects for legally earned income.
For instance, most every licensing scheme can be argued to be in the public interest and
most every violation of the law, including illegal parking, can be argued to be contrary to public
policy. From a racist or simply a privileged conservative point of view, a great deal of black
South African income was contrary to law and “public policy” (based on contravening liquor
laws, hawking and taxi licensing requirements). From the view of a privileged white person, one
could argue that violations of these laws and regulations caused serious health and safety
problems (e.g. unsafe working conditions, unsanitary food, and unsafe taxis). Violations of these
laws and regulations would confirm the views of some racists that it was the black South African
who was to blame for her or his inability to earn “lawful” income. In other words, a racist judge
would be less likely to see the black decedent as having lawful income earning potential.
Of course, a progressive judge could reason that all black South Africans had legal
earning potential and that it was the apartheid system that was to blame for their illegal status.92
In other words, it was due to the lack of decent lawful employment opportunities as well as a
lack of decent lawful and affordable services that forced so many black South Africans to
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NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 240-41.
The South Africa Marketing Council looks to the “unregulated” informal economy as a source of untapped
potential when it says, “The country’s bustling informal economy, largely unmeasured and unregulated, has
developed alongside its sophisticated industrial economy, and represents untapped potential for the country’s future
economic development.” South Africa: economic overview at
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operate taxis, sell food, open auto body and repair shops, and to sell liquor without licenses (not
to mention, selling one’s body, drugs and other more dangerous illegal activities).93 Poor people
not only need access to income but also to cheap food, transportation and other services.
For so many people living and working in the informal economy there simply is not a
viable “licensed” or “legal” alternative. It is through cases like Ferguson that the delict system
reinforces the gross inequities of apartheid. While the surviving dependant of a rich person who
made millions exploiting black labor is richly compensated for loss of support, the poor
dependant whose breadwinner eked out a living as an unlicensed fruit hawker, auto body worker,
domestic worker or prostitute gets nothing but funeral expenses.94

B.

Fortunate Orphans and Unfortunate but Remarriageable Widows (Surviving Spouses)
In the case of Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk. v. Victor, N.O.,95 the Appellate

Division leaned in a more progressive direction than Professor Kutner cared to accept. The
Court sought to distinguish the present case from the accepted rule that a claim for loss of
support by a “remarriageable widow” needed to be reduced by the chances that the widow may
get remarried (and thus not need the compensation).96 The appellant argued that the surviving
dependant child’s claim for loss of support should be reduced due to the subsequent adoption of
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For instance, the Constitutional Court in Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill, 2000(1) SA 732 (CC), noted that under apartheid liquor and liquor regulations
were a means of social control over black South Africans. Id. at para. 31.
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It is only recently that domestic workers have been guaranteed a minimum wage and a host of labor rights. See
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997: Sectoral Determination 7: Domestic Worker Sector, South Africa,
available at
http://www.labour.gov.za/download/9855/Sectoral%20Determination%207%20Domestic%20Workers.doc (last
visited Apr. 4, 2005). (The Minister of Labour, in terms of section 51(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act 75 of 1997, makes a Sectoral Determination establishing conditions of employment and minimum wages for
employees in the Domestic Worker Sector, South Africa, which appears in the schedule hereto and determines
September 1, 2002 as the date from which the provisions of this Sectoral Determination shall be binding).
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1986 1 SA 601 (AD). Note that the analysis in this section draws heavily from my work in Review, 120 S. AFR.
L.J. 903 (2003) (reviewing VISSER & POTGIETER, supra note 73); see also VISSER & POTGIETER, supra note 73.
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the child,97 But the Court distinguished the case based on the idea that the adoption was more
like a separate gift than a benefit that flowed from the wrongful death.98 Thus, the Court held
that the claim for loss of support by the dependant adopted child was not to be reduced.99
According to Kutner, the court did not extend the rule to this case “…because it doubted
the soundness of the widow's remarriage rule.”100 This would have been wise. However, the
court retreated from this view and was content to assume that “…a widow's remarriage or chance
of remarrying was to be brought into the assessment of damages in fatal accident cases.”101 One
may have expected Kutner to embrace this decision. The generous gift of adoption should not
relieve the defendant of its obligation to pay for the support of the child when that support was
lost through a wrongfully and negligently caused death. The adoption is a completely separate
transaction that is only tangentially caused by the wrongful death.

The same is true of

remarrying and in particular having a court diminish one’s damages for loss of support based on
a court’s assessment of the dependant’s likelihood of remarrying.

A new marriage is a

completely separate transaction; and while the death technically causes one to be eligible to
remarry, it is not the real cause.102 In both the case of adoption and a remarriage there is an
intimate, almost sacred, covenant that is being entered into and the wrongful and negligent
defendant should not get the benefit of this collateral source of support.
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Id. at 322 (citing Constantia, 1986 1 SA at 606).
The term used was “ex caritate” or that done out of love or affection. Id. at 322 (citing Constantia, 1986 1 SA at
613).
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Id. at 323 (citing Constantia, 1986 1 SA at 613).
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102
Outside of sarcastic remarks, would anyone refer to the death of a spouse as the reason or cause of marrying
someone else?
98

28

Kutner does not embrace the above view. Not only does he not think that there should be
a distinction between the two cases,103 he argues that:
The real loss to the survivor is the difference between the support that
would have been provided by the deceased spouse or parent and the support that
will be provided by the new spouse or parent. Awarding a greater amount of
damages puts the dependant in a better economic position than if the death had
not occurred.... Limiting the defendant's liability to the actual loss that the
dependant will sustain does not constitute an unwarranted benefit to the
defendant. It is true that over-compensation would be avoided if damages were
calculated without regard to remarriage or adoption and then applied to support
the spouse or child, but this would relieve the new spouse or adoptive parent of
the obligation of support. Should a person wish to have the benefit of a marital or
parental relationship, he should be prepared to bear the normal obligation of
support and not try to avoid it because his spouse or adopted child can receive an
award of damages on account of a prior relationship.104

This has the equities wrong. It is inequitable to require the adoptive parent or new spouse to
bear the “normal burden” while the defendant who wrongfully and negligently caused the
“burden” is relieved of that burden. The primary benefits and burdens of marriage and adoption
are not financial but are physical, emotional and psychological, and the defendant bears none of
these burdens.105
The remarriageability rule is arguably still “good law”, although it is constitutionally
suspect. P.J. Visser and J.M. Potgieter, in The Law of Damages, list the rule under ‘dependant
widow.’106 Categorizing the rule in this way, rather than as ‘dependant spouse,’ in itself should
raise concerns. The concerns multiply and intensify once one sees how the rule functions. The
authors cite T. Davel for a list of factors that the courts consider in assessing the
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Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 324.
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wrongful death under the Aquilian action. See Union Gov’t v. Warneke, 1911 AD 657 (denying a claim of loss of
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‘remarriageability’ of the dependant survivor.107 The factors are: (1) age, (2) character, (3)
appearance, (4) ‘the duration and happiness of the marriage with the deceased,’ (5) ‘the presence
of small children which may hinder social intercourse,’ (6) the existence of a relationship at the
time of trial, (7) the plaintiff’s own views on remarriage, (8) the fact that the receipt of damages
apparently increases the prospects of remarriage, (9) high esteem for the deceased, (10) health,
and (11) statistical facts regarding remarriage.108
The fact that a judge evaluates the marriage prospects of a dependant widow or spouse is
a prima facie affront to that person’s dignity.109 With one or two exceptions, the factors used
envisage a highly speculative and deeply personal assessment of what characteristics of a person
make her or him remarriageable. In addition to offending the rule of law by being speculative
and arbitrary,110 the exercise raises problems with regard to dignity, freedom of association,111
freedom and security of the person,112 and particularly the right not to be unfairly discriminated
against on the basis of one’s marital status.113
Factor 8 captures much of why this exercise is problematic. If giving full compensation
leads to a higher chance of remarriage, then reducing the award will also reduce the chances of
remarriage. Thus, on the basis of this alone, the court is caught over-compensating or undercompensating on the stated probabilities. The problem does not end here. If the court chooses to
under-compensate, because in its estimation there is a good chance that the dependant widow or
widower will remarry, then depending on the level of financial dependency, she or he will be put
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in a position where she or he is pressured to seek remarriage.114 One who is fully compensated
has the luxury of not needing to find a spouse for support and can base marriage decisions on
other considerations, e.g. love. The dependant widow or widower who needs support and is
denied that support because the court believes her or him to have good marriage prospects, will
have the compounded problem of not only needing to find a spouse for support but also being
less marriageable because of the reduced award.115
Kutner may be forgiven for being unable to anticipate the provisions of the Final
Constitution, but one does not need an explicit right to dignity and a right not to be discriminated
against based on one’s marital status to see the problems with the rule. In the U.S., it is
relatively well established that not only is remarriageability irrelevant to the amount that should
be awarded for loss of support,116 but even if the dependant spouse has remarried, this fact is not
to be taken into account in the award of damages.117 The support offered for this view is said to
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While many households have both spouses contributing to the economic welfare of the family, for many
households in South Africa, the loss of a breadwinner is not the loss of “extra” income but of income that is essential
to meet the minimal needs of the family.
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While I think the entire process is so offensive to the Constitution that it ought to be abandoned, at the very least
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practice, they support T. DAVEL in the view that the courts should not abandon their consideration of the prospects
of remarriage as it is a ‘relevant factor.’ See VISSER & POTGIETER, supra note 73, at 226 n.156 (citing T. DAVEL,
AFHANKLIKES at 128, and accompanying text). At the very least, the court should not be allowed to perform a
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against relationships that fall short of marriage or of a duty of mutual financial support. Notice, that such a rule
would also put pressure on people not to remarry, or at least to attempt to convince the court that remarriage was not
their intention.
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See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Death § 268; id. at nn.1-2 (citing to §§ 376-78); see also Annotation, Admissibility of
Evidence of, or Propriety of Comment as to, Plaintiff Spouse’s Remarriage, or Possibility Thereof, in Action for
Damages for Death of Other Spouse, 88 A.L.R.3D 926 § 4 (2004).
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See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Death § 268; see also id. at n.3 (citing numerous cases in support of this positions). In
fairness, Kutner notes that U.S. law was relatively unique among common law countries in holding this view.
(personal communication). See also Kutner, Wrongful Death Law, supra note 100.
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be twofold: 1) the wrongdoer should not get the benefit of the reduction,118 and 2) the cause of
action arises and damages are fixed at the time of decedent’s death and thus a later marriage is
irrelevant.119 The cases referred to in the A.L.R. reveal a third justification and that is the
speculative nature of the exercise, even in cases where remarriage has taken place.120 If it is
speculative in cases of actual remarriage, then inquiring into remarriageability is exponentially
speculative.

C.

The overlap of contract and delict – “pure economic loss” vs. physical loss
The last case that Kutner addresses is Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v. Pilkington

Brothers (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd.121 Kutner makes his view of the case plain when he says, “If there is
any South African case that deserves the title "Delict Case of the Eighties," it is Lillicrap,
Wassenaar and Partners v. Pilkington Brothers (S.A.) (Pty.).”122
The plaintiff in this case was a glass manufacturer who contracted with the defendant, an
engineering consultant firm, to carry out a subsoil investigation to determine the suitability of
the site for the erection of a float glass plant, as well as to design and supervise the construction
of the plant.123 The defendant did all three.124 After the plant was finished and glass production
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123
Lillicrap, 1985 1 SA 475 at 494.
124
Pilkington, 1983 2 SA at 158.
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began, it was clear that the soil was not suitable for the plant as there was movement in the
furnace, bath and lehr.125 It cost about 3.5 million rands to get the plant into a condition in
which it was suitable for making glass.126 Although the plaintiff would likely have had a good
claim in contract, it sued in delict because his contract claim prescribed while his delict claim
did not.127
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in its soil investigation, in its
design of the works, and in its supervision of construction.128 The trial court judge, Judge
Margo, categorized this as a fairly straight forward case of physical damage caused by the
negligent design and negligent supervision of the construction of the plant.129 The main issue in
the case was whether or not there was a legal duty of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant
(the issue of wrongfulness in delict). In his decision, Judge Margo did not see the contractual
relation as an obstacle to the claim in delict.130 The parties had not included an exclusion clause
in the contract,131 and there were no policy reasons against holding that the defendant had a duty
of care toward the plaintiff. Margo noted that the relevant considerations included policy
considerations such as the relationship of the parties and the question of indeterminate
liability,132 and that in this case there was no worry of indeterminate liability.133
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The Appellate Division held that this was a case of pure economic loss.134 If it were a
case of physical damages the question of wrongfulness or legal duty would be trite. Although
the court acknowledged that South African law recognized claims for pure economic loss,135 it
did not believe that there was a duty in this case that could be separated from the contractual
duty.136 There was no independent right that was violated.137
The court further noted that this was a case of first impression dealing with whether the
“…negligent performance of professional services rendered pursuant to a contract, can give rise
to the action legis Aquilae”138 and that South African law takes a conservative approach to
developing the law of delict.139 Rather than asking, as Judge Margo did, if there were policy
reasons against extending a remedy to this case, Acting Justice Grosskopf asked if there was any
need to extend liability in this case.140 He reasoned that since they both had adequate remedies
under contract law there was no need to recognize the action in delict.141 He argued further that
“…in general, contracting parties contemplate that their contract should lay down the ambit of
their reciprocal rights and obligations. To that end they would define, expressly or tacitly the
nature and quality of the performance required from each party.”142 He saw no reason why the
law of delict should be used to enforce the contractual duty.143 His view was that if one wanted
to bind a party in delict then it should be put into the contract.
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The decision prompted a strong dissent by Acting Justice Smuts. Justice Smuts largely
agreed with Judge Margo that, should the parties want to be exempted from liability in delict,
they can put that into the contract.144 Otherwise,
where a person is by circumstances, which may include the conclusion of a
contract with another, placed in a position where it would be clear to a reasonable
man that the failure to exercise care is likely to result in unlawful harm being
done to another, a failure to exercise that care, with resultant harm to another, will
entail delictual liability…145
While the contract brought the two into this relationship, there is still a duty to take care in a
situation like this where a negligently conducted soil test will foreseeably result in damage.146
Lillicrap is generally regarded as a conservative case by South African academics.147
The defendant was a highly skilled professional on whom the plaintiff reasonably relied to carry
out the soil inspection with due care. A reasonable person in the position of the defendant would
foresee considerable harm that could result from improperly carrying out the tests and designing
and supervising the building of a glass plant on unsuitable soil. No one was in a better position
to know the risks of harm involved. Further, the harm done was to the physical plant that was
constructed improperly for the soil that was beneath it and to the glass that could not be properly
made.
144

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
146
Id. at 510.
147
Boberg calls this a conservative case and notes that most of the commentary on the case is negative. BOBERG,
DELICT,supra note 86, at 15-16. Kutner also acknowledges this. Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 362. (referring
to Andrew Beck, Delictual Liability for Breach of Contract, 102 S. AFR. L.J. 222, 225 (1985); P. Q. R. Boberg,
Back to Winterbottom v. Wright?-- Not Quite!, 102 S. AFR. L.J. 213, 217 (1985); Jonathan Burchell & Mervyn
Dendy, Law of Delict, in 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 181-87; Deborah Pearmain, A Delictual
Remedy for Breach of Contract--To Be or Not to Be?, 7 DE JURE AC LEGIBUS 22 (1985)). But see Paul van
Warmelo, Liability in Contract and in Delict, 102 S. AFR. L.J. 227 (1985) (supporting judgment's distinction of
delictual and contractual liability) (cited in Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 362). Boberg refers to most of this
commentary but adds Dale Hutchison & D. P. Visser, ‘Lillicrap Revisited: Further Thoughts on Pure Economic
Loss and Concurrence of Actions,’ 102 S. AFR. L.J. 587 (1985). For further criticism of the case see BURCHELL,
supra note 24, at 3-9; Dale Hutchison & Belinda van Heerden, The Tort/Contract Divide Seen from the South
African Perspective, in THE LIMITS OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 100 (Daniel Visser ed. 1997); Mervyn Dendy,
Wrongs to the Pocket XIII: Life After Lillicrap, 21 BUSINESSMAN’S LAW at 45 (1991); Mervyn Dendy, Reflections
on Reading Bernstein’s ‘Economic Loss,’ 111 S. AFR. L.J. at 592) (1994)).
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Despite the clearly conservative nature of the case, Kutner concludes:
Notwithstanding the differences between South African law and English law
referred to148 -- which have been narrowed considerably by cases subsequent to
Junior Books149 -- the majority judgment in Lillicrap warrants favorable
consideration in common law jurisdictions when the question of liability for
economic loss caused by negligence is addressed.150
Since the Lillicrap decision, some courts have read Lillicrap narrowly to allow for
concurrent delictual and contractual pure economic claims based on the finding that Lillicrap did
not foreclose such claims if a delictual duty could be made out. For instance, as noted by the
court in Holtzhausen v. Absa Bank Limited, 151
“in Durr v. ABSA Bank Ltd., a case which concerned the duties of an investment advisor
recommending investment in debt-financing instruments, Schutz JA found no difficulty
in saying: ‘The claim pleaded relied upon contract, alternatively delict, but as the case
was presented as one in delict, and as nothing turns upon the precise cause of action, I
shall treat it as such.’”152

Other courts have sought to distinguish the case based on the parties. Thus in Pinshaw v
Nexus Securities (Pty) Ltd.,153 the court refused to extend Lillicrap to quasi-professionals
offering financial services arguing that, “The cases in this developing area of the law, in this
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Kutner, Top Ten, supra note 25, at 362 n.552.
Id. at n.553.
150
Id. at 362. Kutner’s support for the decision is based on the opportunity for the parties to allocate the risk in
question through the contact. Id.
151
Case No. 280/03 (SCA Sep. 17, 2004), available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/files/28003/28003.doc?PHPSESSID=48001398c2aa5d9198cd9db6fa61382c
(last visited Mar. 25, 2005). (An action is maintainable in delict for a negligent misstatement causing pure
pecuniary loss even if a concurrent action is available in contract. The denial of an action in delict in 1985 (1) SA
475 (A) (Lillicrap) is limited to the case where the negligence alleged consists in the breach of a term of a contract)
(unreported but “reportable”)).
152
Id. at para. 7 (quoting Durr, 1997 (3) SA 448, 453G (SCA)) (citation omitted)).
153
2002 (2) SA 510 (C). Plaintiff sued (as the second defendant) a director of an investment company (Nexus, the
first defendant) in delict for pure economic loss occasioned by the bad investment by him of funds she had entrusted
to the company.
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country and elsewhere, do not indicate a need to extend the Lillicrap embargo to a broader class
of defendants.”154
The court in Holtzhausen criticized this case for misunderstanding the scope of
Lillicrap.155 The court in Holtzhausen also clarified how Standard Chartered Bank of Canada
v. Nedperm Bank Ltd.,156 (where the defendant bank was held liable for pure economic loss in
the context of a contract to perform services) could be reconciled with Lillicrap, stating “The
difference between the two cases is simply this. In Standard Chartered Bank the negligence
relied on did not consist in the breach of a contractual term. In Lillicrap, it did.”157 In other
words, the result in Lillicrap was caused by the failure to make a delictual complaint.158 Thus,
the way to avoid Lillicrap is to properly frame the breach as a breach of one’s delictual duties
and to frame the damages in delictual terms.
As a result, South Africa no longer views pure economic loss cases with prejudice and no
longer sees pure economic loss cases as being primarily governed by contract. Thus, one need
not write delictual liability into the contract to preserve it.
This case may not have come out differently in the U.S. While, as a general rule, U.S.
law does not preclude a plaintiff from pursuing a tort claim in lieu of a contract claim if both
arise from the same conduct,159 U.S. law is conservative when it comes to pure economic loss
claims. The general rule defines the boundary between the overlapping theories of tort and
contract law by barring the recovery of purely economic loss in tort, particularly in strict liability
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Id. at 535 (discussing Lillicrap, 1985 1 SA 475 (AD)) (citations omitted)).
Holtzhausen, supra note 151, at para. 9.
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Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v. Nedperm Bank Ltd., 1994 (4) SA 747 (A).
157
Id. at para. 10.
158
Id. at para. 6 (quoting Lillicrap, 1985 1 SA 475 at 499D-F).
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See R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1797 (2000).
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and negligence cases.160 The doctrine provides that those seeking damages may only collect that
which is allowable under contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code, to the exclusion of
any tort remedies for purely economic damage.161

However, the majority of jurisdictions

recognize exceptions to this rule, including fraud and misrepresentation, as well as design and
contractor liability.162 The majority rule is known as the “modern rule” or the “foreseeability
doctrine.”163 This rule provides that the contractor is liable for injury or damage to a third person
as a result of the condition of the work, even after completion and acceptance by the owner
where it was reasonably foreseeable that a third person would be injured due to the contractor's
negligence or failure to disclose a known dangerous condition.164 There is no requirement that
actual injury occur; only that the danger was known but not disclosed by the contractor.165

IV.

ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: WHAT IS MISSING FROM THE RECORD -- THE ABSENCE
OF PROGRESSIVE DELICT REFORM UNDER APARTHEID
This section looks at the broader context of the law of delict under apartheid.

In

particular, it looks at what was missing from Kutner’s analysis and more importantly, what was
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See id.
See Steven C. Tourek, et. al., Bucking the “Trend”: The Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss
Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 875 (1999).
162
Id. at 876; see also Patrick O’Connor, Jr., The Rights and Responsibilities of Design Professionals, in
CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS No. 2002-4 at 17 (2002).
163
See Emmanuel S. Tipon, L.L.M., L.L.B, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Regarding Tort Liability of
Building or Construction Contractor for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring after Completion and
Acceptance of Work; “Foreseeability” or “Modern Rule,” 75 A.L.R. 5th 413 (2004) (citing MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
164
See id. at § 3-58.
165
See id. While the minority rule is a bit antiquated in light of increased building regulations, safety and liability
requirements, a few states still hold to the “completed and accepted rule" or "acceptance rule," providing no liability
for injury or damage to a third person as a result of the condition of the work, after completion, and after its
acceptance by the owner, even if the injury was a direct result of contractor’s negligence. See id. (citing Minton v.
Krish, 642 A.2d 18 (Conn. App. 1994)). Unless the defective condition was dangerously, inherently, or imminently
dangerous, and the contractor conceals defects in the work from the owner, or where the work constitutes a nuisance
per se, thereby triggering strict liability in tort, there is otherwise no liability. See id.
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missing from the law of delict under apartheid.166 To narrow the universe down a bit it will
focus on a number of changes that have taken place in American tort law as a result of
democratization that have not taken place in South Africa. Those changes include:
1)

class actions,

2)

strict liability/ products liability and related doctrines like res ipsa loquitor,

3)

punitive damages,

4)

contingency fees (as opposed to loser pay costs awards), and

5)

consumer protection law.

I will not only address what was missing under apartheid but will also bring out the changes that
have taken place in these areas since the end of apartheid.

A.

Class Actions
Prior to the Interim and Final Constitutions, class actions were generally barred in South

Africa.167 This is because under the common law there are problems with standing for class
actions. The general rule in South Africa is that only the party who has suffered a legal injury
personally can approach the court for relief.168 There have been exceptions. In the case of Wood
and others v. Ondanwgwa Tribal Authority and another,169 the Appellate Division allowed
church leaders to bring an interdict in the name of a large group of persons who feared that they
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This is not intended as a criticism of Kutner’s work. It is unfair to criticize an author for failing to address a
topic, particularly when that topic is not relevant to his thesis. The point here is to further show how the
development of the law of delict was arrested under apartheid.
167
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION (SALC), The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest
Actions in South Africa (1998) at ch.3 § 2 (Lack of standing at common law)., at
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj88_classact_1998aug.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter
SALC, Class Actions].
168
Ibid.
169
1975 2 SA 294 (A) (allowing church leaders to bring an interdict in the name of a large group of persons who
feared that they would be illegally arrested, detained, tried and subjected to summary punishment due to their
political affiliations).
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would be illegally arrested, detained, tried and subjected to summary punishment due to their
political affiliations. However, in subsequent cases, organizations have not been allowed to
bring claims on behalf of their members; but rather individual members have been required to
bring the claims.170 One post-apartheid decision has held that outside of constitutional claims,
South African law does not permit representative or class actions.171
In 1998 The South African Law Commission called for the urgent introduction of
legislation allowing for class actions and public interest actions in addition to those that are
allowed under the Constitution for Bill of Rights matters.172 Class actions are also allowed under
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act173 The Act follows the
language of the Final Constitution, which provides for very broad standing. The Act reads:
20. (1) Proceedings under this Act may be instituted by –
a) any person acting in their own interest;
b) any person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their
own name;
c) any person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class
of persons;
d) any person acting in the public interest;
e) any association acting in the interest of its members;
f) the South African Human Rights Commission, or the Commission for
Gender Equality.

The definitions section broadens this by defining “person” as including a juristic person, a nonjuristic entity, a group or category of person.174
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Ahmadiya Anjuman Ihaati Lahore (S. Afr.) & another v. Muslim Judicial Council (Cape) & others, 1983 4 SA
855, 864 E-F (C); S. Afr. Optometric Ass’n v. Frames Distrib. (Pty) Ltd., 1985 3 SA 100, 103F-105C (O); Natal
Fresh Produce Growers’ Ass’n & others v. Agroserve (Pty) Ltd. & others, 1990 4 SA 749, 758 G -759 D (N). See C
Loots Keeping Locus Standing in Chains, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 66 (1987).
171
Contralesa v. Minister for Local Gov’t, E. Cape, 1996 2 SA 898, 903, 905E-H (TkSC).
172
SALC Class Actions, supra note 167. at ch.3 (Need for Legislation).
173
Act No. 4 of 2000 (“the Equality Act”).Ch. 4 (Equality Courts), § 20 (Institution of proceedings in terms of or
under Act).
174
Id. at ch. 1 § 1.
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The Final Constitution’s standing provisions mirror those of the Equality Act, save the
omission of standing for the Gender and Human Rights Commissions.175 Persons under the Final
Constitution include juristic persons and the Bill of Rights applies to such persons “to the extent
required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.”176
Note that Equality Act proceedings deal exclusively with issues of unfair discrimination,
hate speech and harassment while the Bill of Rights has a broader scope.

The proposed

legislation would allow for both public interest litigation, which it recommends would not result
in res judicata, and normal class actions, which would.177 Public interest actions need not even
benefit the petitioner as they may be brought in the interest of the public at large, even for
mistreated animals.178

B.

The Relative Absence of Strict Liability and Related Doctrines in Delict.
As a general rule there is no liability without fault in the South African law of delict.179 The

exceptions are, vicarious liability,180 statutory based strict liability (e.g for: fire caused by
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S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 38 (Enforcement of Rights).
Id. at § 8(4).
177
SALC, Class Actions, supra note 167, at 32.
178
Id. at 6.
179
For instance in Boberg’s classic, DELICT, supra note 86
, the chapter on fault is titled “Fault: Mainly
Negligence” and it addresses negligence and some intentional torts. See id. at ch.3. There is almost no treatment of
strict liability in the text. He referrs to one commentator who does not believe that strict liability cases fall under
delict at all. See id. at 16 (citing N.J. VAN DER MERVE & P.J.J. OLIVIER, DIE ONREGMATIGE DAAD IN DE SUID
AFRIKAANSE REG (4th ed. 1980).
180
South African courts have continued to shift between a conservative and expansive approach to frolic cases.
The Supreme Court of Appeal itself has swung back and forth on the issue. The unprincipled approach to this area
of the law was criticized by this author in Law of Delict, in 2000 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 328
[hereinafter Roederer, Delict 2000]; and Law of Delict, in 2001 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 356
[hereinafter Roederer, Delict 2001]. The conservative approach was taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal in K. v.
Minister of Safety & Security, 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) holding the State was not vicariously liable for the rape of a
stranded women by three on duty uniformed police officers who offered to give her a ride home on the basis that the
men were on a frolic of their own, based on the interest theory and subjective approach to vicarious liability. This
was overruled in N. K. v. Minister of Safety & Security, Case CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) (holding the State
vicariously liable on the basis of the risk theory and the objective approach to vicarious liability along with the
constitutional rights of the victim, the constitutional and statutory duties of the police, and the values of the South
African Constitution).
176

41

trains,181 damage by aircraft,182 nuclear energy providers,183 electricity providers,184 and to
telecommunications lines and call office boxes),185 a few roman based actions, (e.g. for domestic
animals (the actio de pauperie), wild animals (actio de feris), grazing animals (actio de pastu),
for things thrown out windows (actio de effusis vel deiectis) and falling off or out of buildings
(action positi vel suspensi)),186 and actions in the area of injuria (i.e. wrongful deprivation of
property and liberty and until 1998 for defamation by media defendants).187

181

Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989 provides for the strict liability of
railways for damage caused by locomotives. Id. Sch
edule 1 § 2 para. 2. See also NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35,
at 381. The legal progress in this area moved from a rebuttable presumption of fault under the 1919 § 70 of the
Railways and Harbours Regulation Control and Management Act 22 of 1916, to one of strict liability under an
amendment to the act by Act 14 of 1943. Id. There remained inconsistencies in the legislation which were cured by
legislation in the early 1980s (Act 65 of 1981). Id. at 381-82. The strict liability provisions of the Act only apply if
the railway is notified within three days of the event and if one does not have a firebreak on one’s property one can
only receive half of the damages. See Roederer, Delict 2000, supra note 180, at 345. The court in Swanepoel en ‘n
ander v. Transnet Bpk, 2000 (2) SA 191 (T), indicated in dicta that the three day prescription period might be
contrary to the right to have one’s case adjudicated by a court under section 34 of the Final Constitution. Id. at 19798.
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Strict liability for damage by aircraft was introduced in 1923 by section 9 of the Aviation Act 16 of 1923, and
this continues in section 11(2) of Act 74 of 1962. See also NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 282. It does allow
for a defense based on the fault of the plaintiff in section 11(3) of Act 74 of 1962 (ibid).
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See § 61(1) of Nuclear Energy Act 131 of 1993. Fault on the part of the plaintiff is not generally a defense under
the Act. The only defenses are based on the unauthorized presence of a plaintiff, and intent. Id. at § 61(4)(a).
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In the case of electricity providers, early legislation provided for liability without fault. See § 49 of Act 42 of
1922; § 50(1) of the Electricity Act 40 of 1958. However, the strict liability of electricity providers was changed to
a rebuttable presumption of negligence in section 19 of Act 54 of 1989. See Grootboom v. Graaff-Reinet
Municipality, 2001 (3) SA 373 (E). Neethling et al., criticize this as step in the wrong direction. See NEETHLING ET
AL., supra note 35, at 383 n.172.
185
See § 108 of the Post Office Act 44 of 1968 (cited in NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 383) (a wrongdoer who
negligently causes this damage is guilty of a criminal offense under § 108).
186
See NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35 at 365-71. The position on nuisance is unclear as there is some authority
for the proposition that liability is strict (based on English authority) and some for the proposition that there is a
presumption of fault. Id. at 371-72.
187
Before Pakendorf, 1982 (3) SA 146 (A), the rule was that one needed to establish intent to defame or animus
iniuriandi. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 347. If the publication was defamatory with regard to the plaintiff
there was a presumption that there was intent to defame. Id. at 347. In Pakendorf, the requirement of animus
iniuriandi was replaced with strict liability for media defendants. 1982 3 SA at 156-58. This was overruled in
National Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi, 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA), on the ground that democracy required a free press. Id. at
1210-11. Bogoshi established a defense of reasonable publication to the presumption of animus injuriandi. Id.
Some have argued that this established a negligence standard for media defendants. See e.g., NEETHLING ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 348. It is more correct to say that reasonableness is a positive defense to the presumption that one
has intentionally defamed another. The intent to defame is still established by intentionally publishing defamatory
material. The reasonableness defense for the publication primarily acts as an alternative to the defense of truth and
public interest. It comes in when one has published a false defamatory statement that was nonetheless reasonable to
publish based on such factors as the reasonable checking of sources and the urgency and importance of the
publication.
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Outside of these areas there are a number of doctrinal developments that took place in
England and in the U.S. that did not take root in South Africa. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,188
that established strict liability for the escape of dangerous things from the land that one owned or
occupied, was not received in South Africa.189 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, although
developed in South Africa, only gives rise to an inference of negligence and up until recently,
never a presumption.190 Additionally, South Africa never developed strict liability in the area of
products liability.191
While it is the case that manufacturers have a duty to not produce defective products, one
must still show that the manufacturer was negligent in its breach of that duty.192 The first step is
to show that the product in question is defective. However, this alone is not sufficient; for a
finding of liability it must also be shown that there was fault on the part of the manufacturer,193
that damage was reasonably foreseeable and preventable.194
In cases where it is difficult to prove that the manufacturer was negligent, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor may come in to aid the plaintiff.195 However, under South African law, the
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Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
BOBERG, DELICT, supra note 86, at 17.
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See infra note 313 for discussion of Wagener v. Pharmacare Ltd.; Cuttings v. Pharmacare Ltd.., 2003 (4) SA
285 (SCA).
191
Although Boberg references a considerable mass of South African scholarship arguing in favor of strict liability
in the area of products liability, he does not endorse the idea himself. BOBERG, DELICT, supra note 86, at 196. In
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FRAMEWORK 31-32, at www.dti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/conslawreview.htm [hereinafter GREEN PAPER].
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NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 324.
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Id. at 325.
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doctrine has merely given rise to an inference of negligence, 196 not a prima facie case nor a shift
in the burden of proof,197 which remained on the plaintiff.198
The decision of Justice Coetzee in A. Gibb & Sons (Pty) Ltd. v. Taylor & Mitchell Timber
Supply Co. (Pty) Ltd.199 provides an interesting window into this area of the law from the South
African perspective. Justice Coetzee was presented with a case of first instance in which the
plaintiff was attempting to hold a merchant seller liable for putting a defective product in the
market (a board used for scaffolding broke when used by the plaintiff’s employee).200 At that
time there was only one short essay published in South African on the issue.201 Thus he turned
to the U.S., noting the rapid development of products liability since Cardozo’s famous 1916
opinion in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. disposing of the privity of contract requirement in
cases of dangerous products.202 The privity issue never was a bar to a delict action in South
Africa; so to some extent South Africa was ahead of the U.S. and England.203 However, as
Justice Coetzee noted, “further development can be summed up by saying that, after overtaking
us, America outstripped us.”204 By this time, most jurisdictions in the U.S. had already adopted
strict liability.205 Further, Justice Coetzee marveled at the way U.S. courts in jurisdictions where
fault remained the standard had found a variety of ways to expand the duty of care owed by
defendants.206 He referenced a distinct difference in attitude between a wary and hesitant South
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See e.g., id. at 151-52, 326; Bayer South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. v. Viljoen, 1990 2 SA 647, 661-62 (A).
NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 152.
198
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African judiciary and that of America (particularly California)207 which had produced this
“unbelievably brisk” transition.208 He went so far as to say that this may represent the high water
mark to South African eyes.209
Recent developments in Res Ipsa Loquitor
In a case heard on exception, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Wagener v. Pharmacare
Ltd; Cuttings v. Pharmacare Ltd., 210 declined the invitation to develop the common law in light
of the constitutional right to bodily integrity in section 12(2) of the Constitution so as to impose
strict liability in products manufacturing cases. Justice Howie, for a unanimous Court,
recognized that the section 12(2) right to bodily integrity was both constitutionally entrenched
and protected by the common law.211 The Court considered it unnecessary to develop the
common law so as to render a manufacturer strictly liability on the basis that the Court could
take the less drastic measure of taking a more liberal approach to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
by, for instance, allowing for the onus to shift to defendants to rebut a presumption of negligence
in such cases.212
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He is referring to the developments in California which began with Judge Traynor’s concurrence in Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 (1944). G. Edward White, in TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (expanded ed., Oxford 2003) references the reliance of Judge Traynor, on Prosser’s 1941 treatise where he
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loquitor. See BOBERG, DELICT, supra note 86, at 198 (citing PROSSER, supra note 205, at 689). The majority in
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Id. He quoted extensively from section 402A of the Restatement of the Law of Torts (2d ed.) concerning the
special rule of strict liability for sellers of articles for consumption. Id. at 462, discussed in BOBERG, DELICT, supra
no
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Id. at paras. 14 & 19-21.
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The Court went on to express the view, in obiter dicta, that if product liability was to be
rendered strict liability, it would be preferable for the legislature to effect that change.213 Justice
Howie recognized that strict liability might have to be imposed, “in compliance with the
Constitution were a situation to arise in respect of which there was no remedy at all in existence
or a patently inadequate one, and the dictates of the Constitution led to the need for change.”214

C.

Punitive Damages
Although punitive or exemplary damages were introduced into South African Law via the

English influence,215 it is settled that “[i]t is no longer possible to recover or award an amount to
punish someone by means of an action for damages.”216 Van der Walt asserts that “in principle
all factors and circumstances tending to introduce penal features should be rigorously excluded
from such assessment.”217 His view is based on at least three ideas: 1) the notion that it is the
function of criminal law to punish and deter and of delict to compensate; 2) there is undue
enrichment to a victim if punitive damages are awarded; and 3) there is a risk of undue
punishment, or double jeopardy of punishment if one can be punished under both civil and
criminal law.218

213

Id. at paras. 26-38.
Id. at para. 30.
215
Visser & Potgieter note that the “English principles of aggravated, punitive, vindictive, penal and exemplary
damages had a considerable influence on our [South African] law. VISSER & POTGIETER, supra note 73, at 174.
They mention that there were early references to nominal and special damages in Breda v. Miller, (1829) 1 Menz
425 (trespass on land); Hart & Constatt v. Norden, (1845) 3 Menz 548; Cawoods v. Simpson, (1845) 3 Menz 542
(breach of contract not causing damage); and a reference to “vindictive damages” in Keyter v. Le Roux, (1841) 3
Menz 23, 31. Id. at 12). Exemplary or punitive damages were introduced in De Villiers v. Van Zyl, 1880 Ford 77.
Id. at 13.
216
Id. at 174.
217
J. C. VAN DER WALT, DELICT: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 6 (1979).
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Id.
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The Constitutional Court in Fose v. Minister for Safety and Security219 (a case alleging
torture of the plaintiff by the police) followed the view of Van der Walt220 when it found that the
plaintiff did not need further Constitutional damages, nor punitive damages to vindicate the
constitutional rights that allegedly had been violated by police.221 The damages sought in Fose
were 50,000 rands for pain and suffering; 50,000 rands for loss of enjoyment of the amenities of
life and shock; 10,000 rands for contumelia;222 and 20,000 rands for past and future medical
expenses.223 They also asked for 200,000 rands in constitutional damages which were said to
include “an element of punitive damages.”224
Justice Ackermann, writing for the Court noted the difficulty in drawing the line between
“an award of aggravated, but still basically compensatory damages” and “the award of punitive
damages in the strict and narrow sense of the word.”225 For the Court, cases involving damages
for contumelia (i.e. those involving solatium or seeking satisfaction) were awards of
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Fose was heard on appeal from the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court (Fose v. Minister of
Safety & Sec.,1996 (2) BCLR 232). Fose, 1997 (3) SA 786 at para. 1. The case arose out of an alleged series of
assaults by the police . Id. at para. 11. The plaintiff claimed that the assaults were a violation of his fundamental
rights as found in the Interim Constitution. Act 200 of 1993 (“Interim Constitution”). Id. at para. 12. Those rights
included human dignity at section 10 of Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution); freedom and security of the person
at section 11(1)-(2); privacy at § 13; and the right not to be arrested or detained, except in accordance with sections
25(1)-(2) of the Interim Constitution. See Fose, 1997 (3) SA 786 at para. 12. The plaintiff further alleged in
paragraph 16 of his pleadings that the violations were part of a wide-spread and persistent pattern of similar
infringements by the police at the station in question. Id. at para. 12.
220
Van der Walt’s views are favorably quoted in Fose, 1997 (3) SA 786 at para. 63.
221
Fose, 1997 (3) SA 786 at paras. 67-73. It is only Justice Kriegler in his concurrence who appropriately describes
the facts as they were asserted by the plaintiffs, namely that this was an allegation of widespread, systematic, and
pervasive pattern of “brutal torture” by members of the South African Police Services. Id. at paras. 101- 02
(referring to the plaintiffs pleadings in paragraphs 9-11 containing a “litany of brutal torture.”).
222
Contumelia may be said to be contempt for one’s person. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 15. Or it may be
an insult to one’s dignity or self respect. VISSER & POTGIETER, supra note 73, at 465. Damages for it are available
under the actio iniuriarum. NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 16. The actio iniuriarum includes wrongful and
intentional damage to or insult to one’s corpus (body), fama (reputation), or dignitas (dignity). Id.
223
Id. at para. 13. The exchange rate between the rand and dollar in 1997 was between 4.64 and 4.87 to the dollar
(monthly rates for 1997 are available at http://www.x-rates.com/d/ZAR/USD/hist1997.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2005)). Thus, the dollar amounts would be approximately 1/5 of these amounts ($24,000) which is low for a “litany
of brutal torture.”
224
Fose, 1997 (3) SA 786 at para.13. This is approximately $40,000.
225
Id. at para. 62.
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“aggravated, but still basically compensatory damages.”226

Here the plaintiff clearly

distinguished the two by asking both for 10,000 rands for the contumelia and for 200,000 rands
for “Constitutional/punitive” damages.
The Court in Fose reviewed the situation in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Trinidad and
Tobago, New Zealand, Ireland, India Sri Lanka, Germany, and under the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights, and concluded that while most of the countries studied did
allow for punitive damages as part of constitutional damages (with the exception of Germany),227
the academic literature from such countries noted problems with focusing on the punitive and
deterrent features of such a remedy.228 The Court made it clear that it did not think that punitive
damages would be an effective deterrent against the government229 and that money from the
public purse could be put to better uses in order to eliminate or reduce the cause of
infringements.230
In his concurring opinion, Justice Didcott clarified that Fose did not extend to claims
against individuals, particularly corporations.

He pointed out that such a case would be

significantly different for two reasons, “The first difference is that no award would be payable
from the public coffers. The second is the appreciably enhanced plausibility and effectiveness of
deterrence.”231 Thus for Justice Didcott it followed that “…the argument in favour of punitive or
exemplary damages would be stronger, were they not sought against the state.”232
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The court also remarked that the comments in the submitted cases were obiter dicta and that “in the past number
of decades they [nominal damages] have very seldom if ever been awarded in delictual claims.” Id.
227
Id. at para. 64.
228
Id. at para. 66.
229
Id. at para. 71.
230
Id. at para. 72. This was particularly true given that the plaintiff was fully compensated.
231
See id. at para. 88. Justice Kriegler in his concurrence also made it clear that “we should refrain from any broad
rejection of any particular remedies in other circumstances.” Id. at para. 91. In fact, Kriegler would not foreclose
punitive damages being available in other cases against the State to vindicate constitutional rights. Id. at paras. 92,
103, 104.
232
Id. at para. 88.
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D.

Contingency Fees
Contingency fees in the U.S. are sometimes blamed for our litigiousness. However,

without contingency fees many plaintiffs who lack the resources to pay for lawyer’s fees up front
would be denied access to justice. If this is true in the so called “land of opportunity,” imagine
the case of South Africa which in 2000 had fifty percent of its population living below the
poverty line233 and as of 1995 had one of the world’s worst Gini indexes (an index that reflects
the amount of disparity between rich and poor in a country).234 However, under Apartheid,
South Africa did not allow for contingency fees and in fact, should one lose her or his case that
party would be required to pay the opposing party’s legal fees.
South Africa finally enacted the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 upon the
recommendation of the South African Law Commission on Speculative and Contingency
Fees.235 The Act removes the common law prohibition on contingency fees except in family law
and criminal proceedings.236 It is important to note that the Act does not remove the requirement
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See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK at
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/sf.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). According to the same source the
U.S. has 12% of its population living below the poverty line as of 2003. Id. at
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html.
234
The CIA World Factbook put it at 59.3 (based on data from1993-94). Factbook-South Africa. The UNDP
concurs in its Human Development Reports (2003) (based on its 1995 survey) at
www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_126_2_1.html. The Factbook put the Gini index for the U.S. at 45 as of
2004, while the UNDP put it at 40.8 (as of 1997). The U.S. ranked seventh in the world in human development
rankings while South Africa ranked 111th (UNDP). The Gini index measures the degree of economic inequality in a
given country with an index of zero being absolute equality and one hundred being absolute inequality. Id. A recent
fact sheet says that the index rose to .69 in 1996, and up to .77 by 2001. CRAIG SCHWABE, SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN
SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, GIS CENTRE, Poverty in South Africa (July 26, 2004) available at
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000990/index.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (provided by Southern Africa
Regional Poverty Network).
235
Project 93 Report of 1996. The Act is administered by the Department of Justice and went into effect on April
23, 1999. Contingency Fee Act 66 of 1997, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1997/a66-97.pdf (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
236
Section1(v) of Contingency Fee Act 66 of 1997, supra note 235.
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that the losing party of the law suit pay the cost of the prevailing party.237 Undoubtedly the
contingency fee will make it more affordable to bring a claim with merit. However, if the claim
does not have merit, then lawyer who takes the case risks being uncompensated. Furthermore,
the losing party is still generally required to pay opponents legal fees even if she or he is not
required to pay her or his own lawyer.238

E.

General Consumer Protection Law
Following the publication of the commissioned Consumer Law Benchmark Study in May

of 2004,239 the Department of Trade and Industry published its Draft Green Paper on the
Consumer Policy Framework.240 Concededly, much of the recommended legislation does not
squarely deal with delict, but with contracts and regulations. However, consumer protection law
requiring fair contract terms, especially in the case of standard form contracts, limits the ability
of merchants to contract out of delictual liability. Regulations promoting safety and disclosure
will inevitably lead to a reduction in the delicts that occur. Promoting easier access to courts
and/or to alternative dispute mechanisms as well as imposing strict liability on retailers and
manufacturers has a considerable impact on the law of delict and on the efficacy of the law of
delict.
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Section 3(b)(ii) requires that the contingency fee agreement contain a clause stating that the client was informed
of the normal rule that should the client be unsuccessful that he/she/it may be required to pay the costs of his/her/its
opponent in the proceedings. Id. at § 3(b)(ii).
238
The SALC Class Actions Report recommends that courts not require unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay for cost when
they lose public interest actions unless special circumstances apply. See supra note 167, at 31.
239
BOTHA & KUNENE ADVISORS, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY at
www.dti.gov.za/ConsumerLawBenchmarkStudy.pdf (last visited on Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter BENCHMARK].
240
See supra note 192. Most legislation in South Africa starts with the distribution of a Green Paper from the
Ministry in charge of the area of legislation. The Green Paper is a paper setting out policy options for the area in
need of legislation. After comments are received the Green Paper is followed by a White Paper which again is
circulated for comment. The next step is a draft Bill which may be circulated in the Gazette for further comment
before the final Bill is put before parliament. For an explanation of the South African legislative process see
www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/process.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). Note that impo
rtant policy
shifting legislation often begins with the research and reports of the Law Reform Commission.
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The Benchmark report recommended a legislative strict liability regime for both
manufacturers and retailers.241

It recommended a consumer bill of rights,242 regulation of

standard form contracts and unfair contract terms,243 disclosure and labeling legislations,244as
well as legislation that governs guarantees and warrantees.245 The draft Green Paper notes that
“The apartheid government and its policies deprived the majority of South African[s] of political,
economic and human rights…Historically disadvantaged South Africans were prevented from
becoming active participants in the market, other than as a source for cheep (sic) labour. ….The
apartheid legacy also included a disregard for consumer rights.”246 It notes that “[t]he current
body of consumer law in South Africa is fragmented, outdated and predicated on principles that
are not applicable in a democratic and developing society.”247 It notes that the absence of a
comprehensive law dates back to the 1980s and the apartheid free market mentality which only
intervened in the market in areas where problems emerged.248
The Green Paper reports consumer needs ranging from non-misleading marketing and
selling practices; adequate disclosure of information; fair contract terms; safe products and a
better product liability regime; guarantees and warranties for product quality, and aftercare;
respect for their privacy; better access to tribunals for redress (including alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms); awareness and education.249 While South Africa does have safety
standards with regards to medicines, foodstuffs and electrical goods, it does not have legislation
for other manufactured goods, e.g. legislation requiring safety standards for children’s
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BENCHMARK, supra note 239, at 82, 150.
Id. at 143.
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Id. at 147.
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clothing.250 “Furthermore, consumers do not have some of the most basic rights, such as a right
to fair contract terms and fair and transparent adverting and marketing.”251
F.

Summary
Although Kutner did not have the benefit of hindsight provided by the many changes that

took place in the law of delict after the fall of apartheid, he may be faulted for failing to see how
much was missing in South Africa in comparison to what was available to the plaintiff in the
U.S. Across the board, South Africans were denied the same level of access to justice afforded
the American tort victim, be it by way of class actions, contingency fees, favorable products
liability laws, consumer protections laws and punitive damages. Finally, as illustrated by Fose
above, damage awards in South Africa are exceptionally low in comparison to U.S. awards.

V.

POST- APARTHEID TRANSFORMATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA

A.

South Africa’s Transformative Values

Even if it can be maintained that certain parts of the law of delict were not tainted by
apartheid, it does not follow that the law of delict as it stood at the end of apartheid was
compatible with the values, and aspirations of the democratic transformation of South African
law and society.

If South Africa’s democratic transformation was a liberal or libertarian

transformation then there may be good arguments that the private common law did not require

250
251

Id. at 31.
Id. at 24.
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any change.

252

If the Final Constitution was found to echo the values of libertarianism found

under the hegemony of contract law then we should not expect much change under the
hegemony of constitutional values. However, the values of the transformation as contained in
the Founding Provisions, throughout the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution as a whole are not
limited to the values of liberty or freedom from intervention. Quite the contrary, they include
such values as dignity and equality,253 and ridding the country of its various forms of
discrimination and inequality.254 The extensive list of rights in the Bill of Rights, which includes
not only traditional, liberal civil and political rights but also social, cultural and economic
rights,255 is a clear indication that the new spirit underlying South African law is not merely one
of the value of freedom in the market, but one of good neighbourliness and of being a
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Note, however, that libertarian theories that are historically based would still recognize that if present holding
were the result of unjust acquisitions and transfers of property then there would need to be redistribution of that
property. See e.g. R NOZICK ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
253
As Justice Kriegler stated in President of the RSA and another v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1997 (CC), “The South
African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an egalitarian Constitution… [I]n light of our own particular
history, and our vision for the future, a Constitution was written with equality at its centre. Equality is our
Constitution’s focus and its organizing principle.” Id. at para. 74.
254
Section 9(2) of the equality clause specifically allows for “affirmative action” where it states: “To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”
255
Chapter 2 of the Constitution includes substantive rights under the following headings: Equality, Human
Dignity, Life, Freedom and Security of the Person , Slavery, Servitude and Forced Labour, Privacy,
Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion, Freedom of Expression, Assembly, Demonstration, Picket and
Petition, Freedom of Association, Political Rights, Citizenship, Freedom of Movement and Residence,
Freedom of Trade, Occupation and Profession, Labour Relations, Environment, Property, Housing, Health
Care, Food Water and Social Security, Children, Education, Language and Culture, Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities, Access to Information, Just Administrative Action, Access to Courts, Arrested,
Detained and Accused Persons. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights).
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cooperating member of the political community.256 The Constitution envisions accountable,
transparent governance under what some have termed a culture of justification.257
The Constitution not only contains negative rights, but also positive duties. The post
amble to the Interim Constitution contained a reference to the term ubuntu.258 As Pieterse writes,
“The Nguni word ubuntu represents notions of universal human interdependence, solidarity and
communalism which can be traced to small-scale communities in pre-colonial Africa, and which
underlie virtually every indigenous African culture.”259 In S v Makwanyane,260 justice Langa said
the following of the concept:

[Ubuntu] is a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the interdependence of the
members of a community. It recognises a person’s status as a human being, entitled to unconditional
respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community such a person happens to
be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to give the
same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it
256

Note that the South African Constitution directs its interpreters to the values of dignity, equality and freedom as
well as to both comparative law and to international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. It states:
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
b. must consider international law; and
c. may consider foreign law.
S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights) § 39(1).
257
As Etien Mureinik states, the new dispensation is based on “…a culture of justification - a culture in which every
exercise of power is expected to be justified.” E. Mureinik, A Bridge to Where: Introducing the Interim Bill of
Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994). The idea is that the new dispensation makes a break from the
authoritarian ethos of apartheid under which the exercise of power by the State was neither justified nor justifiable.
Mureinik draws from Ronald Dworkin’s notion that the overall point of law is to justify state coercion. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93, 109-10, 127, 190, 400 (1986). One of the mechanisms that clearly support this
culture of justification is section 36 of the Final Constitution, which requires that rights can only be limited by laws
of general application, and only to the extent that the law is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors. S. AFR. CONST. (Act
108 of 1996). These ideals are found in the Constitution in section 1(d), and affirmed in section 41(1)(c), which
provides, “All Spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must -- … provide effective,
transparent accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.” They are reiterated in Rail
Commuters Action Group & Others v. Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail & Others, 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC); 2005 (4) BCLR
301 (CC) paras. 74-78.
258
It states that South Africa’s legacy of “gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian
principles in violent conflicts and . . . hatred, fear, guilt and revenge” could now be addressed “on the basis that
there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for
ubuntu but not for victimisation.” S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993)).
259
M. Pieterse, “Traditional” African Jurisprudence, in JURISPRUDENCE 441 (Christopher J. Roederer & D.
Moellndorf eds.,2004).
260
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (holding unconstitutional the death penalty).
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regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual
enjoyment of rights by all. . . .261

Finally, the provisions of the Constitution that bind individuals and which provide for the
harmonization of the common law with the Constitution reinforce the fact that the values of the
new South African political community do not stop at the door of the private realm and cannot
be excluded by the private law. In a sense there is no more private realm which is sealed off from
public values. What exists is a Constitution with the potential to transform all of South African
law.262
B.

The Constitutional Mechanisms for Developing the Common Law
The South African Constitution is somewhat unique in that it has explicit provisions that

allow for the harmonization of the private law with the values, spirit, purport and objects of the
Constitution. Over the last couple of years there have been substantial changes in the law of
delict that have been made in light of the new constitutional regime. Although the courts were
slow to embrace the duty to develop the common law in light of the Constitution, there has been
steady progress in this regard. There were some developments prior to the constitutional case of

261
Id. at paras. 224-25. Justices Mahomed (at para. 263) and Mokgoro (at para. 308) also addressed the meaning of
the concept, both emphasizing the notion of humaneness and reciprocity, and the latter emphasizing the centrality of
the notion to the development of South Africa’s democracy. Justice O’Regan drew on these values in N.K. v.
Minister of Safety & Security, CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005), at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/x/0/5?searchdata1=CCT52/04#top. In N.K., O’ Regan
addressed the fact that the notion of vicarious liability is not alien to the South African customary law tradition, for
under customary law the Kraalhead is liable for all the delictual acts of inhabitants of the Kraal. N.K., CCT 52/04 at
para. 24 n.30.
262
Carl Klare has argued that the new South African constitutionalism is a post liberal, redistributive, egalitarian and
caring form of constitutionalism. Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
146, 151,153 (1998). Klare was writing in the context of the Interim Constitution, but the Final Constitution is no
less progressive. He notes the following elements found in the Interim Constitution in support of his view: 1) social
rights and substantive equality, 2) affirmative state duties, 3) horizontality, 4) participatory, decentralized and
transparent governance, 5) multi-culturalism, and 6) historical self consciousness. Id. at 153. All of these values
can be found in the Final Constitution.
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Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security,263 however, that case provided a watershed for the
constitutionally inspired development of the common law. The case of Carmichele has acted as
a watershed because prior to that case the lower courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal acted as
if the evaluation/ re-evaluation of the common law in light of the Constitution was optional, at
best.264 For instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mostert v. Cape Town City Council
acknowledged that constitutional arguments might be relevant to deciding the case but also noted
that they had not been made by counsel and thus the decision would have to be made in
accordance with the “common law.”265 Justice Swart in Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety and
Security responded to an attempt by counsel to raise a constitutional argument in that case with
the remark, “The law of delict is to be found in the law of delict.”266 In Carmichele, the
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2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). The few decisions that drew on the Constitution when developing the common law
included: Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd., 1996 (2) SA 40 (T) (Transvaal local division) (Cameron, J.); Nat’l
Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi, 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) (although the Court claimed that it was not relying on the
Constitution when changing the common law of defamation it dealt with the constitutional analysis put forward by
Justice Cameron in Holomisa); Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender
Equality Intervening, 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) (Mahomed, J.); and Faircape Prop. Developers (Pty) Ltd. v. Premier,
Western Cape, 2000 (2) SA 54(CPD) (Davis, J.). All of these judges had impressive human rights resumes before
joining the bench. Both Justices Davis and Cameron had previously worked for the Centre for Applied Legal
Studies (a human rights public interest legal center at the University of the Witwatersrand Faculty of Law). Justice
Davis was the director of the centre during the 1990s. Justice Cameron became an acting member of the
Constitutional Court (1999-2000) and is now on the Supreme Court of Appeal. Justice Mahomed was an acting
justice on the Constitutional Court from 1995-1998 and then he served as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Appeal from 1998 to 2000, when he passed away. Although there were more cases in 2001 that addressed the
Constitution and its impact on the law of delict, Justices Cameron and Davis are responsible for most of them.
264
See Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). As noted in Roederer, Delict 2000:
The question of whether the common law and its development comport with the values of the Bill
of Rights is a thorny and contentious issue. Without the aid of good advocacy it is understandably
difficult for judges in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal to adequately address the
issue (particularly given their heavy case load, the conventions of an adversarial system and the
fact that they do not have their own researchers). Nonetheless, the duty remains.
Supra note 180, at 282.
265
2000 4 All SA 379 para. 28 (A).
266
2001 (4) SA 646, 658D (T). Francois du Bois notes the tension among judges between characterizing their
actions as developing the common law according to traditional common law practices versus doing so in light of the
Constitution’s mandates. Introduction to INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 7 (C.G. van der Merwe &
J.E. du Plessis eds., 2004). See also Michelman, supra note 19, at 11
- 23 (detailing the tussle between the Supreme
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, and between approaching the development of the common law in
terms of the Constitution or merely the common law). The latter approach by the high courts or the Supreme Court
of Appeal may be used as a way of insulating cases from constitutional review by the Constitutional Court.
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Constitutional Court made it clear that these approaches to the common law were no longer
appropriate. As it stated:
It needs to be stressed that the obligation of courts to develop the common law, in
the context of the section 39(2) objectives, is not purely discretionary. On the
contrary, it is implicit in section 39(2) read with section 173 that where the
common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the
courts are under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.267

There are at least three, if not four, constitutionally inspired approaches to the common law and
its development. They may be viewed as falling on a spectrum ranging from:
1. direct constitutional application with a direct constitutional remedy,
2. direct constitutional application with an indirect constitutional remedy,
3. indirect constitutional application with an indirect constitutional remedy, and
4. simply constitutionally compatible or inspired.268
The first approach takes section 8(1) of the Final Constitution seriously on its own as binding the
judiciary in cases where rights in the Bill of Rights are in issue. Section 8(1) reads, “The Bill of
Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of
state.” People have argued that a weaker version of this provision in the Interim Constitution,
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Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para. 39. This is reinforced by section 237, which states that “[a]ll
constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without delay.” There has been resistance by the
Supreme Court of Appeal to the pervasive application of the Constitution to the private law. For instance, in the
case of K. v. Minister of Safety & Security, 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal argued that cases
like Carmichele, which addressed the issue of wrongfulness of police conduct, were not applicable to cases
involving the application of the “frolic rule” in vicarious liability cases involving the police. K., 2005 (3) SA 179
(SCA) at para 8. The Supreme Court of Appeal argued that the case before it was merely a case of factual
application of the frolic rule and did not involve issues of public policy or constitutional values. Id. at para. 8.
Justice O’Regan, in N.K., rejected this limitation on the reach of the Constitution into the law of delict. N.K., CCT
52/04 at para. 19. She clarified that the obligations of section 39(2) not only included cases where a completely new
common law rule is developed but when incremental extensions of existing rules to new facts take place. Id. at para.
17. This effectively collapses the distinction between simply applying the existing rule to a new set of facts and
creating a new rule and deprives the Supreme Court of Appeal the strategy of de-constitutionalizing cases by
categorizing them as merely ‘factual’ or application cases.
268
Although it is my view that one can generally achieve the same substantive outcome through all four routes some
judges may be more open to the different approaches. It might be wise in some cases to argue the different
approaches in the alternative.

57

which did not specifically bind the judiciary, could be read to have significant horizontal
impact.269 This interpretation of the provision was rejected by the majority of the Court in
DuPlessis v. De Klerk under the Interim Constitution.270 The argument was revived with more
strength under the Final Constitution by some academics271 and was argued before the Court in
the case of Khumalo v. Holomisa.272
However, this separate direct horizontal application approach was rejected by the
Constitutional Court because it would render section 8(2) and 8(3) superfluous or redundant.273
Section 8(2) specifically addresses horizontal application, that is, it specifically states that natural
and juristic persons are bound by the Bill of Rights, under certain conditions, and section 8(3)
specifically states that, when there is no existing adequate remedy under the common law or in
legislation, the remedy for a section 8(2) violation is to develop the common law. This is what is
sometimes called direct-indirect horizontal application or direct-mediated horizontal application.
The Constitution directly applies and persons are directly bound by section 8(2), but the remedy
is not a separate constitutional remedy, but rather a remedy that integrates or infuses what is
constitutionally required with the development of the common law under section 8(3). This is
the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in Khumalo. It ensures that there is not a
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For example justice Kriegler’s dissent in DuPlessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) was based on the idea that
all law was subject to the Constitution including the common law when either party tried to raise the law to defend
his, her or its position (914-915). S. Woolman notes that every commentator on the application of the Bill of Rights
under the Interim Constitution prior to DuPlessis held the view that anytime a party in a private dispute raised a
statute, it was subject to constitutional review. See S. Woolman, Application, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA 31.1 (M Chalskalson et al eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2005).
270
1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). For sustained critique of the majority decision see, e.g. S. Woolman, Application, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA §§ 10.3(a)(i), 10.3(a)(v), 10.3(b) (S. Woolman et al eds., 1999) and S.
Woolman & D. Davis, The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism and the Application of
Fundamental Rights Under the Interim and Final Constitutions, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 36 (1996).
271
E.g. Woolman & Davis, supra note 270.
272
2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para. 30.
273
Id. at para. 32.

58

separate constitutional tract; rather, the dictates of the Constitution are fulfilled through the
development of the common law.274
Nonetheless, there are two other routes to the same substantive outcome.275 The third
route, known as indirect application, existed under the Interim Constitution in section 35 and was
replicated in section 39 of the Final Constitution. This route appears less constitutional because
it is not phrased in terms of binding provisions, but in terms of interpreting and developing the
common law in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. However “un-law –
like” those provisions may sound, the Constitutional Court has held that section 39 cases are
constitutional,276 and the Constitutional Court in Khumalo held that the development of the
common law under section 39 is substantially equivalent to the development of the common law
under section 8(2) and 8(3). In other words, if these two approaches are carried out properly, the
result is the same.
By implication, the Constitutional Court also endorsed any case in which the common
law development reflected the appropriate constitutionally inspired balance of competing rights
and/or values.277 In such cases rights and/or values may simply inform and add weight to
existing common law rights and duties through traditional common law mechanisms (e.g. the
balance between freedom of expression and dignity and reputation in defamation cases as well as
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The idea of there being separate tracts was in part due to the structure of the courts under the Interim Constitution
scheme where it was determined that horizontal application was purely indirect. See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996
(3) SA 850 (CC). The Supreme Court of Appeal was the crown of a court system that dealt largely with nonconstitutional issues while the Constitutional Court was separate from that system and was to deal with
constitutional issues. The Final Constitution integrated the courts so that every high court can (and now must)
address constitutional matters.
275
Both of these other approaches were endorsed by the Constitutional Court in Khumalo.
276
Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA 938 at paras. 50-55.
277
This is because the court embraced the substantive considerations made by the court in Bogoshi which did not
rely on the section 35 Interim Constitution analysis to found its decision, but rather held that the Pakendorf decision
had had the balance wrong all along. It did not matter that the court in Bogoshi declined to use the Constitution
since its reasoning and its decision was supportable in light of those values.
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notions such as the “legal convictions of the community,”278 “boni mores,” “public policy,” and
“reasonableness”).
This allows for the harmonization of the common law in general and delict in particular
with the values and aspiration of the democratic transition as embodied in the Constitution. In
effect it deconstructs the public and private law divide. As stated by the Constitutional Court in
Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers
Association of South Africa:
There are not two systems of law, … each operating in its own field with its own highest
court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the
constitution and is subject to constitutional control.279

This ensures that the private law is a partner in the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
The legislation and case law below will further elucidate the values of the transition and show
how the law of delict may be infused with those values so as to aid in the transformation of
South Africa’s law and society and in the consolidation of democracy.
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This is a common formulation of the test for legal wrongfulness in delict as is the boni mores and public policy.
Reasonableness is a factor in both the wrongfulness/duty of care analysis as well as in negligence. It is common to
argue that values of the Constitution now embody the legal convictions of the community. See, e.g. Faircape Prop.
Developers (Pty) Ltd. v. Premier, Western Cape, 2000(2) SA 54, 65 (CPD) (Davis, J.).
279
(2000) (2) SA 674 (CC), (2000) BCLR 241 (CC) para. 44. Frank Michelman argues that it is a mistake to claim
that all law derives its force from the Constitution for the force of law comes from pre-legal understandings of the
“ultimate rule of recognition.” Michelman, supra note 19, at 11-41. While the force of law may not derive from the
text of the Constitution, it does not follow that it does not derive from the Constitution. If the Constitution is “the
legal embodiment of the values of post apartheid South Africa…[as] nothing less than South Africa in legal form”
then the proposition makes more sense. See Roederer, Post-Matrix, supra note 19, at 80-81. Michelman comes
close to embracing this idea when he concludes his chapter with the following observation:
We merely suggest that when the CC spoke in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of all law deriving its force
from the Final Constitution, it may have been giving expression to that side of its mind that decidedly
favours having constitutional values (post-matrix) drive the enquiry into the adequacy of all other law,
rather than the reverse. This may have been the CC's way of conveying that there remains in South Africa
no trace of law that does not act discursively like the law of the Final Constitution; no law that does not, in
that sense, bear the Final Constitution's genes. ..To say that is to say something significantly more than that
all law has to harmonize with the spirit, purport, and objects of the Final Constitution. Michelman, supra
note 19, .at 11-44.
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VI.

CONSTITUTIONALLY INSPIRED CHANGES IN THE LAW OF DELICT

A.

Legislation
As noted above, section 8(3) of the Final Constitution provides that the courts should

develop the common law to fashion a remedy when a constitutionally appropriate remedy is not
available through either existing legislation or the common law. As this indicates, the courts are
not envisioned as the only, or even the primary, developers of the law. As detailed supra,
Section IV, there is a considerable amount of legislative reform that is either being considered or
is taking place in South Africa that will impact private law in general and delict in particular,
ranging from class actions, public interest actions, contingency fee arrangements, and consumer
protection laws. One piece of legislation, however, stands out as representing a truly
transformative development in the overlap of public and private law. This development, taking
place in principle in 2000 and in fact in 2003, is the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of 2000 as Amended by Act No. 52 of 2002.280 Act No. 4 was
mandated by section 9 of the Final Constitution to give further effect to the equality provisions of
the Constitution.281 The need for this type of legislation is acknowledged in the preamble to Act
No. 4 of 2000:
The consolidation of democracy in our country requires the eradication of
social and economic inequalities, especially those that are systemic in nature,
280

The Act remained dormant until June 13, 2003, when the President signed the Proclamation that brought sections
4(1), 7- 23, 30, 31 and 34(2) into operation (Proclamation No. R 49 of 2003). These provisions came into effect on
the 16th of June when the regulations relating to the prevention of unfair discrimination were also promulgated
(Regulation Gazette No. 7683 Vol. 456 No. 25065). Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(2), 5, 6, 29 (with the exception of subsection
(2)), 32, 33 and 34(1) were put into operation in 2000. Chapter 5 of the Act (sections 24-28) which relates to the
promotion of equality and its regulations have not yet come into effect, but draft regulations came out in 2004 and
are available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/eqact/legislation/20040428_eqc_draf%20reg_ch5.pdf (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005).
281
“No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of
subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.” S. AFR. CONST.
(Act 108 of 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 9(4).
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which were generated in our history by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, and
which brought pain and suffering to the great majority of our people;
Although significant progress has been made in restructuring and
transforming our society and its institutions, systemic inequalities and unfair
discrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, practices and
attitudes, undermining the aspirations of our constitutional democracy….
This Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic society,
united in its diversity, marked by human relations that are caring and
compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, equity, social
progress, justice, human dignity and freedom,…

Among other things, the Act seeks “to provide remedies for victims of unfair discrimination, hate
speech and harassment and persons whose right to equality has been infringed.”282
The Act utilizes a number of novel mechanisms for achieving these ends. It has specific
provisions dealing with the prohibition of unfair discrimination by the State and by persons283 on
a wide range of grounds,284 as well as provisions on the promotion of equality by the State and
persons through affirmative action and equality plans.285 The Act also has provisions prohibiting
hate speech,286

harassment,287 and the dissemination of information that unfairly

discriminates.288

282

Section 2(e) (Objectives) of Act 4 of 2000.
Section 6. Discrimination in the act is defined broadly as “unless the context indicates otherwise -- …(viii)
“discrimination” means any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which
directly or indirectly –
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from,
any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds.” Id. at § 1(viii).
284
The Act also provides that, “unless the context indicates otherwise -- …
(xxii) ‘‘prohibited grounds’’ are—
(a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth; and
(b) any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground—
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage;
(ii) undermines human dignity; or
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable
to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (u).” Id. at § 1(xxii).
285
Chapter 5, §§ 24-38.
286
Section 10.
287
Section 11.
288
Section 12.
283
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Other mechanisms include broad standing provisions,289 and relaxed procedures and
evidentiary rules. The regulations to the Act provide that, “The inquiry must be conducted in an
expeditious and informal manner which facilitates and promotes participation by the parties.”290
The court is given broad inquisitorial powers under sections 10(5)(b)-(c) and 10(10)(b)-(c), and
the normal procedures of the court hearing the case may be altered in the interest of justice in
order to give effect to the guiding principles of the Act.291 Likewise, the rules of evidence may
also be altered so that “fairness, the right to equality, and the interest of justice” prevail over
“mere technicalities.” 292
Parties may be represented by an attorney, an advocate, or anyone of their choice (e.g. a
paralegal, academic, minister, etc.),293 and are to be notified of their rights to representation at
their own cost unless they cannot afford one, in which case they are to be informed that they may
apply to legal aid or other institutions for legal assistance.294
The Act provides for a variety of innovative remedies going well beyond anything seen in
the field of delict in South Africa thus far. As noted in the guiding principles, the remedies in the
Act are not only corrective but also are meant to have a deterrent and restorative effect.295 Some
of the more innovative remedies include:
(e) after hearing the views of the parties or, in the absence of the respondent, the
views of the claimant in the matter, an order for the payment of damages in the
form of an award to an appropriate body or organisation;
(g) an order to make specific opportunities and privileges unfairly denied in the
circumstances, available to the complainant in question;
289

Section 20. As noted supra, Part V, the standing provisions mirror the Constitution’s standing provisions.
Section 10(1) of Regulations Pertaining to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act, 2000 (in effect June 16, 2003), available at:
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/eqact/legislation/eqc_1final_reg_eng.pdf (last visited on Apr. 5, 2005). Notice
that the regulations largely follow section 4 (Guiding Principles) of the Act.
291
Id. at § 10(5)(d).
292
Id. at § 10(7).
293
Id. at § 10(9)(a).
294
Id. at § 10(5)(e)(i). There are also no court fees for equality court proceedings. Id. at § 12(1).
295
Section 4(1)(d) of Act 4 of 2000.
290
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(h) an order for the implementation of special measures to address the unfair
discrimination, hate speech or harassment in questions;
(i) an order directing the reasonable accommodation of a group or class of persons
by the respondent;
(j) an order that an unconditional apology be made;
(k) an order requiring the respondent to undergo an audit of specific policies or
practices as determined by the court;
(l) an appropriate order of a deterrent nature, including the recommendation to the
appropriate authority, to suspend or revoke the licence of a person;
(m) a directive requiring the respondent to make regular progress reports to the
court or to the relevant constitutional institution regarding the implementation of
the court’s order…296

Notice that the list of remedies is not exhaustive; it would not preclude punitive damages if they
were appropriate for the purpose of deterrence and the section explicitly allows for a court to
require that a defendant pay an award to an organization other than the primary victim.297 This
remedy is particularly novel and allows the court to make an award which may go some way in
addressing the broader social harms of inequality and unfair discrimination by putting money
into the hands of organizations committed to combating these broader social harms.298

B.

Case Law

As noted above, prior to Carmichele in 2001 there were not many cases embracing the
Constitution’s mandate to develop the common law in light of the values of the Constitution and
even fewer cases that attempted the section 8(2) direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights
to persons. Although the Carmichele watershed has not created a waterfall of cases, the numbers

296

Section 21(2) .
Section 21(2)(e).
298
See, e.g. the case of Race settlement confirmed by equality court, February 11, 2004, Sapa, available at:
http://www.gmax.co.za/look04/02/11-SAequalitycourt.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005), in which Mr. Pillay, the
colored same sex partner of Professor Pierre de Vos (a human right law professor from the Western Cape), was
excluded from a night club in Cape Town because he was not white. The case settled with the owners giving
apologies to the couple along with 10,000 rands to a gay rights organization (Siyazenzela). Note there have not been
any reported cases under the Act.
297
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of cases in which the courts have applied their mind to the subject has increased. As may have
been expected, most of the cases have been in the areas of the duty of the State to act to
safeguard the people within its jurisdiction (e.g. the police,299 the provincial premier,300 the state

299

Dersley v. Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit, 2000 1 ALL SA 484 (T) (Van Dyk, J.) (using the Police Service
Act 68 of 1995 and the Constitution as factors in determining that the police owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care in
a case involving the negligent misrepresentation by the police that a given car was not a stolen car vehicle, resulting
in the plaintiff purchasing the vehicle and the police subsequently confiscating the vehicle from the plaintiff as
stolen property); Van Duivenboden v. Minister of Safety & Sec., [2001] 4 All SA 127 (C) (Davis, J.) (holding that
section 11(1) of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 along with the Constitution placed a duty on the police to
institute proceedings in terms of section 11(1) to have an assailant’s fire arm license revoked by the police
Commissioner, the failure of which resulted in the assailant subsequently using the firearm to kill his wife and one
child and to shoot and injure the plaintiff), aff’d, Minister of Safety & Sec. v. Van Duivenboden, 2002 (6) SA 431
(SCA) (Nugent, J.) (providing not only a highly informative tour of English, Australian and New Zealand law on the
topic (paras.13-16), but also providing a very thoughtful and thorough analysis of the impact of the Constitution in
cases where the State fails to act); Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety & Sec. (Women's Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus
Curiae), 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) (holding that the police did have a duty to protect the plaintiff from violent harm
and that it violated that duty when it negligently allowed a violent sexual predator to escape from its custody
resulting in the rape of the plaintiff at gun point (basing the duty on the constitutionally inspired legal convictions of
the community; the right of freedom and security of the person entrenched in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution,
along with section 7(2) of the Constitution, which imposed a duty on the State to “respect, protect, promote and
fulfill the Rights in the Bill of Rights;” the section 39(1)(b) provisions which imposed the duty on the State to
recognize its obligation under international law to protect women against violent crime and against the gender
discrimination inherent in violence against women, as well as section 205(3) of the Constitution and the Police
Service Act 68 of 1995 which made it clear that the functions of the police included the maintenance of law and
order and the prevention of crime; and finally, the fact that there was no other practical and effective remedy
available to the victim of violent crime)), rev’g Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2001 (4) SA 646 (T))
(Swart, J.) (holding that the Constitution was irrelevant to the question as to whether the police owed the plaintiff a
legal duty when it negligently allowed a violent sexual predator to escape from its custody and who later raped the
plaintiff at gun point); Geldenhuys v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2002 (4) SA 719 C (Davis, J.) (applying the
Constitution to find a duty on the police to keep the plaintiff, who was in police custody when he sustained serious
bodily injuries, safe from physical harm and finding that they failed in their duty by failing to timeously and
properly investigate the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries and to summon assistance); Carmichele v.
Minister of Safety & Sec., 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (applying the Constitution to find that a legal duty may have
existed on the police and prosecutor and that they may have breached that duty when they recommended the release
without bail of a Mr. Coetzee without placing before the magistrate any information regarding Coetzee’s previous
convictions and history of sexual violence where Mr. Coetzee subsequently violently attacked the plaintiff),
remanded to 2003 (2) SA 656 (C) (Chetty, J.) (finding that the police and prosecution owed the plaintiff a legal duty
and had failed in carrying out the duty); N. K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., Case CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005)
(holding the State vicariously liable for the rape of a stranded women by three on duty uniformed police officers
who offered to give her a ride home on the basis of the risk theory and the objective approach to vicarious liability
along with the constitutional rights of the victim, the constitutional and statutory duties of the police, and the values
of the South African Constitution), rev’g.K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) (holding the State
was not vicariously liable on the basis that the men were on a frolic of their own, based on the interest theory and
subjective approach to vicarious liability and on the dubious exclusion of constitutional considerations).
300
Premier, Western Cape v. Faircape Prop. Developers (Pty) Ltd., 2003 (6) SA 13 (SCA) (holding that the Premier
of the Western Cape was not vicariously liable for damages caused by a negligent decision of one of his ministers to
grant an application to remove a title deed restriction on Faircape’s property because Faircape was the one who
applied for the removal and they should have been aware of the defect in question), rev’g 2002 (6) SA 180 (C)
(Davis, J.) (holding the Provincial Premier vicariously liable for damages caused by a negligent decision of one of
his ministers to grant an application to remove a title deed restriction on Faircape’s property based in part on the
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tender board,

301

and the state transit authority302), and cases involving defamation, which clearly

involve the rights to dignity, reputation and freedom of expression.303 Outside of these areas
there have been a few cases that have drawn from the Constitution, including cases involving
dependants’ actions,304 remedies,305 the fault standard for products liability,306 and even vicarious
liability.307

notion of a culture of justification and the need to hold the government accountable to the people for harm caused by
its negligence).
301
Olitzki Prop. Holding v. State Tender Board & Another, 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) (Cameron, J.) (holding that a
breach by the State, or one of its organs, of duties imposed by section 187 of the Interim Constitution, which
required the legislature to set out a tendering scheme for government contracts/ procurements in accordance with its
provisions, did not constitute a civil wrong entitling an unsuccessful tenderer to sue for damages for lost profits, but
only provided for “review, interdict or out-of-pocket losses”).
302
Rail Commuter Action Group & Others v. Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail & Others, CCT56/03 (CC Nov. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT56-03) (last visited June 11, 2005)
(holding that Transnet Ltd. had a legal duty to keep its passengers reasonably safe from crime on its trains running in
Cape Town), rev’g 2003 (6) SA 349 (SCA) (holding that Transnet Ltd. did not have a legal duty to keep its
passengers safe from crime, for that duty was one placed generally on the shoulders of the police services), rev’g
2003 (5) SA 518 (C) (Davis & Van Heerden, JJ.) (holding that Transnet did have such a duty).
303
See e.g. Sokhulu v. New Afr. Publ’n Ltd. & Others, 2001 (4) SA 1351 (WLD) (holding that statements made
about a television celebrity regarding the birth of her child out of wedlock and her cohabitation for two years with
the child’s father were not capable of giving raise to a claim of defamation, insult to dignity, or contumelia, given
the new societal values enshrined in the Constitution, noting that since one could not discriminate against anyone on
these bases under section 9 of the Constitution, the mentioning of them could not be defamatory or injure one’s
dignity); Marais v. Groenewald en 'n Ander, 2001 (1) SA 634 (T) (developing in dicta the common law in light of
section 39 in a defamation case involving a non media defendant by holding that even if the court was in error in
finding that the plaintiff had the requisite intent and was merely negligent, that a fault requirement of negligence
rather than intent achieved the proper balance between the constitutionally protected personality right to a good
name (section 10) and the right to freedom of speech (section 16(1)) (following Nat’l Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi, 1998 4
SA 1196 (SCA))); Van der Berg v. Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd. & Others, 2001 (2) SA 242 (SCA)
(balancing the right to dignity in section10 against the right to freedom of expression in section 16 to help determine
if the defamatory words were sufficiently relevant to the privileged occasion for them to fall under the privilege in a
case involving a defamatory statement made in the context of legal proceedings; Selemela & Others v. Indep.
Newspaper Group Ltd. & Others, 2001 (4) SA 987 (NC) (following Bogoshi and denying a motion that would
require that the plaintiff plead and establish the truthfulness of the alleged defamatory statements made by the
defendant about the plaintiffs, who were public officials); Botha & Another v. Mthjiyane & Another, 2002 (1) SA
289 (W) (addressing whether a defense of qualified privilege and fair comment would stand against a claim of
defamation where the defendant wrote letters to top officials of the South African Broadcasting Company (SABC)
and to the Human Rights Commission containing allegations of racism and corruption on the part of SABC’s
Language Dubbing Department, and holding that the letters, although defamatory concerned the fundamental right
to equality and were written for the common convenience and welfare of society and thus were covered by the
privilege whereas articles printed in the press based on interviews with the defendant were not covered by the
privilege); Holomisa v. Khumalo, 2002 (3) SA 38 (TPD) and Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC)
(following Bogoshi and holding there is no significant difference between horizontal application under section 8 and
section 39 of the Constitution).
304
Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening), 1999 (4) SA
1319 (SCA) (holding that the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund was required to compensate the Muslim
widow of its insured accident victim for loss of support even though the marriage was not recognized under South
African law (as Muslim marriages were potentially polygamous), finding the duty of support was worthy of
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Cases involving the State
The trend in cases involving the State is to increase the accountability of the State and its
organs for harms caused to the people of South Africa. This has meant imposing positive duties
on the State and finding special relationships that support those duties in cases that would not
have traditionally supported liability.308 It also means requiring the State to act reasonably in

protection as the spouse had such a duty in Islamic marriage law, the marriage was de facto monogamous and to
hold otherwise would be to privilege Christian marriages and this was inconsistent with the new ethos of tolerance,
pluralism and religious freedom which had consolidated itself even before the adoption of the Interim and Final
Constitutions); Metiso v. Padongelukfonds, 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T) (applying Amod and considering the present case
as the next step in the development of the common law in holding that the defendant insurer of the deceased was
liable to pay out on the loss of support claim of the adopted children of the deceased even though the adoption was
legally defective under the common as it was effective under customary law and to hold otherwise would be
contrary to the best interest of the children); Du Plessis v. Motorvoertuigongelukkefonds, 2002 (4) SA 596 (T)
(holding that a stable, long-standing homosexual cohabitation relationship, such as that of husband and wife, did not
establish a duty of support for the purposes of a claim for loss of support, even where other requirements for liability
are satisfied. But see Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Another, 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (holding that
although section 9 generally does not require benefits provided to spouses to be extended to all same-sex partners
where no reciprocal duties of support have been undertaken (as the Constitution cannot impose obligations where
those partners themselves have failed to undertake such obligations), such a duty of support may be inferred as a
matter of fact in certain cases of persons involved in permanent, same-sex life partnerships in a society where the
range of family formations has widened).
305
Fose v. Minister for Safety & Sec., 1997 (3) SA 786 (denying constitutional and punitive damages for the
violation of fundamental rights by the State under the Constitution), discussed supra, Part VI, § C. Mineworkers
Investment Co. (Pty) Ltd. v. Modibane, 2002 (6) SA 512 (W) (holding that the remedy of amende honorable (public
apology) as an alternative remedy to money damages in defamation cases is consistent with section 39(2) of the
Constitution).
306
Wagener v. Pharmacare Ltd.; Cuttings v. Pharmacare Ltd., 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) (declining the invitation to
develop the law in terms of the constitutional right to bodily integrity (section 12(2) of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996) with respect to products liability so as to impose strict liability on
manufacturers, but rather endorsing a more liberal approach to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor for such cases).
307
N. K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., Case CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) (holding the State vicariously liable for
the rape of a stranded women by three on duty uniformed police officers who offered to give her a ride home on the
basis of the risk theory and the objective approach to vicarious liability along with the constitutional rights of the
victim, the constitutional and statutory duties of the police, and the values of the South African Constitution, rev’g
K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) (holding the State was not vicariously liable on the basis
that the men were on a frolic of their own, based on the interest theory and subjective approach to vicarious liability
as well as the dubious exclusion of constitutional considerations).
308
Note that when Carmichele was remanded, the High Court did not mention the requirement of a special
relationship. 2003 (2) SA 656 (C). One may argue that under the Final Constitution no “special relationship” is
required, or that the Constitution itself embodies the “special relationship” that is required. That special relationship
is embodied in the new covenant between the whole of the population of South Africa and its government, as well as
between each other. It may be argued that the constitutional regime is based on a new and different kind of society - one that no longer accepts a mere minimal laissez faire state where, at best, one has negative rights to be left to
one’s own devices, but rather, one in which the people can legitimately expect more from each other and more from
the State by way of positive duties.
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cases where the courts may have traditionally found there to be discretion as to whether the State
was required to act at all.309
Defamation cases
Post-apartheid developments in the law of defamation have seen the overruling of the
strict liability rule for media defendants in order to give effect to the right to freedom of
expression. However, the courts have not elevated freedom of expression to the level of the
paramount right. Neither the values of the free market nor of the market place of ideas are
paramount in South Africa. In the case of Khumalo, Justice O’Regan noted the media’s special
role as both a bearer of the right to freedom of expression and as a bearer of duties.310 She noted
the important watchdog role that the media plays in ensuring that government is “open,
responsive and accountable to the people as the founding values of our Constitution require.”311
Yet, in spite of what appears to be a lofty exaltation of the role of the media and the right to
freedom of expression, Justice O’Regan went on to hold that the right to freedom of expression
is not paramount.312 She held, it must “be construed in the context of the other values enshrined
in our Constitution. In particular, the values of human dignity, freedom and equality.”313 Next,
she analyzed the often competing right to dignity. If not paramount, dignity is foundational.314
By way of amplification, Justice O’Regan quoted the decision of the Constitutional Court in
Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs:
The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot . . . be doubted. The
Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South
Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest
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in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity
therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels.315
According to Justice O’Regan, dignity underlies and weaves together the protection of
reputation, dignitas and privacy in the law of delict.316
Thus, the question of the constitutionality of the existing law of defamation, which places
the onus of establishing the defense of truth on the media defendant, was answered by asking
“whether an appropriate balance is struck between the protection of freedom of expression on the
one hand, and the value of human dignity on the other.”317 She found that the proper balance
was struck by placing the onus on the defendant to either establish truth and public interest or
that publication was reasonable.318
In further defense of the substantive outcome here, it may be noted that the balancing of
the freedom of expression with that of respecting the dignity of those affected by one’s
expression, along with the defense of reasonableness, is conducive to deliberative democracy and
its values.319 In other words, public discussions are not simply free-for-alls; they are not battles
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in the market of ideas where anything goes and one is allowed to win based on any tactic, no
matter how true or false, reasonable or unreasonable, fair or damaging. To be justified,
damaging statements should be true and in the public interest, and when they are not they are
justified only when it is reasonable under the circumstances to publish them. To hold otherwise
would be at best to foster distracting noise into our discourse, and at worst false, damaging and
misleading information that undermines not only our ability to actively and responsibly
participate in the political community.
Dependant claims
Developments in the area of dependant claims have meant the recognition of the duty of
support in situations where the duty was unrecognized under apartheid law. They include the
duties of support by those in Muslim marriages, those who have adopted under customary law,
and those in permanent same-sex life partnerships.

The former were previously denied

recognition because they were potentially polygamous and because of religious bias while the
latter were denied, largely due to heterosexist bias. Customary law duties of support were
generally recognized unless they conflicted with the common law (e.g. in the case of adoption).
In all of these developments, the substance of the relationship came to trump the form of the
relationship. In other words, what was important was that a duty of support was present, not
whether the formal arrangement for that support was defective from the standpoint of the
previous common law rule.
Remedies

principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject…They
are reasons that should be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra, at 3. They further state, “What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an
expansive definition of who is included in the process of deliberation – an inclusive answer to the question of who
has the right (and effective opportunity) to deliberate or choose the deliberators, and to whom do the deliberators
owe their justification.” Id. at 9-10.
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There have not been a great number of developments in the area of remedies, but there
has been some movement to include the restorative justice remedy of an apology as well as to
consider whether constitutional and punitive damages might be required to vindicate the
infringement of rights by persons other than the State. Some of the more creative remedies
found under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of
2000 may be developed under the common law in the future.
Manufacturers’ liability
As noted above, although there is no strict liability in products liability cases the Supreme
Court of Appeal has at least recognized the possibility of endorsing a more liberal approach to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor which would make it considerably easier for consumers
damaged by products to bring successful claims against manufacturers. This is in keeping with
the more comprehensive consumer protection legislation that is on the horizon.
Vicarious Liability
Finally, the constitutionally inspired approach to vicarious liability by Justice O’Regan in
N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Security has resulted in the adoption of the risk theory of vicarious
liability over the traditional interest theory of vicarious liability. As noted above, the courts in
South Africa have gone back and forth between a narrow view of “scope of employment” and a
broad view of “scope of employment.”320 The narrow view is often associated with the interest
theory, which limits the liability of an employer for the conduct of its employees to that which
further the interests of the employer. This is the more libertarian view; and from this view,
vicarious liability is an exception to the general rule that one is to look out for her or him self and
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no one else. 321 They are not their brother’s keepers and the only way to justify holding them
accountable for the actions of their brother’s or sisters is if their brother or sister is going about
his or her employer’s business and furthering her or his interests.322 The Supreme Court of
Appeal adopted this view when it held that the State was not vicariously liable for the rape of a
young stranded woman by three uniformed on-duty police officers who offered her a ride home.
In contrast, the worldview that underlies the risk theory of vicarious liability sees the
person as a cooperating member of the community, who not only competes for whatever she or
he can take from the community but who is nurtured by that community and who has duties to
the members of that community. Those duties include being responsible for the dangers and
risks that they impose on the community and paying for the harm that is caused by the increased
risks that they impose.323
In her opinion, Justice O’Regan drew heavily from the Court in Carmichele for a number
of constitutional values that are relevant to the present case.324 Those values are in part found in
the provisions of the Constitution and The South African Police Service Act, which not only give
women like Ms. N.K. rights but also impose duties on the State. These rights and duties include
the rights to security of the person, dignity, privacy and substantive equality, as well as the duties
found in section 205 of the Constitution and the Preamble of The South African Police
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Service.325 Justice O’Regan quoted Carmichele at length which emphasized the importance of
being free from sexual violence as a prerequisite for equality and self determination, and of the
responsibilities of the police to protect women from such violence.326 She identified the policy
reasons for the rule as affording claimants efficacious remedies, inciting employers to take active
steps to prevent their employees from causing harm to the public, as well as holding employers
liable only when it is fair to do so.327
There are other reasons for vicarious liability not mentioned by Justice O’Regan,
including the balancing of equities between a victim and an employer who:
1.

either generally or specifically profits from the deeds of her or his employees,328 and/
or

2.

who creates greater risks to the public through her or his employees,329

3.

who provides the opportunity and/or tools to her or his employees who cause
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harm,330 and
4.

who is in a better place to not only bear and spread the cost of the harm,331

5.

but who also is in a better place to deter the harmful conduct that takes place.332

These are the typical justifications found in common law jurisdictions and they combine notions
of corrective justice, economic efficiency, and deterrence to outweigh the ‘normal rule’ that one
is not responsible for the delicts of others, but only responsible for her or his own delicts.
Further justifications or principles that might justify the imposition of vicarious liability in the
context of post-apartheid South Africa include such ideals as public accountability,333 nondelegable duties,334 human rights, ubuntu,335 and the overall transformation of South African law
and society from one that is founded on the laissez faire values of freedom and autonomy to one
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founded on equality, dignity, freedom, mutual respect, and caring cooperation in the achievement
of self determination for all South Africans.336
In conclusion, Justice O’Regan held that the opportunity to commit the crime arose because
of the trust put in the policemen, a trust that was constitutionally mandated, and the breach of
that trust constituted a breach of their duties and an infringement of her rights to dignity and
security of the person.337 The delict was held to be intimately connected with the purpose of the
employer rendering the State vicariously liable.338

VII

CONCLUSION
Delict was seriously affected by, and its development seriously limited by, apartheid.

The limitations did not generally consist of blatant racist or sexist laws and decisions (although
that was sometimes the case), but consisted in a conservative libertarian approach to the common
law that assumed the freedom and equality of persons while the apartheid apparatus ensured the
opposite was true.

The cancer worked by limiting access to justice by inhibiting reforms

allowing for class actions, contingency fees, products liability and general consumer protection
laws. It worked by limiting damages for loss of support by invoking the doctrine of “illegal
income,” and by failing to recognize the obligations of support by certain segments of society.
These mechanisms also limited the deterrent effect of delict by failing to hold wrongdoers
accountable. Both the compensatory and deterrent functions of delict were limited by awarding
336
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paltry non-economic damages, and by excluding punitive damages altogether. It worked through
a conservative approach to vicarious liability, and through a conservative approach to holding the
State accountable for its actions generally.
We can also see the potential for the transformation of the private law, and delict in
particular, that comes with a shift to a more democratic society. Carrying through the legal
transformation from public law to private law takes one considerably further in the consolidation
of democracy. Democratic values, ranging from the rule of law, access to justice, participation,
deliberation, and accountability are all strengthened by the integration of the common law with
the Constitution and its values. South Africa’s Constitution embodies the value of freedom, but
the value of freedom is tempered and balanced with the values of equality and dignity. The
equality legislation, as legislation that was not only inspired by but mandated by the
Constitution, might also act as a beacon for the courts in their development of the common law
outside of the areas covered by the Equality Act.

In particular, it might inspire such

developments in the common law as broader standing, easier procedures for class actions or
public interest actions, as well as the whole host of constitutionally inspired remedies.
Many of the delict cases that have invoked the Constitution and its values have allowed
the people of South Africa to bring successful claims against the State and to thereby hold the
State accountable for its actions as well as for its inactions. Legislation and case law have not
only extended rights to those previously denied those rights, but have also extended the duties
that people owe to each other, making South Africans more accountable to each other. In sum,
just as delict was part of the cancer of apartheid, it is now part of the cure. The transformation of
South Africa has propelled changes in the law of delict and those changes in turn have added fuel
to the transformation, helping to further consolidate South Africa’s democracy.
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